By late October 1929 the Wall Street stock-market had crashed, announcing to an astonished world that the post-World War ¡ recovery was not quite as robust as many public figures had appeared to behave.

This accepted view that all was well in the US economy had persisted right through the years of portent; indeed as late as mid-September 1929 the Wall Street Journal proclaimed that 'price movements in the main body of stocks yesterday continued to display the characteristics of a major advance temporarily halted for technical readjustment'.' At this time of uncertainty in global economic performance in the l980s, it is therefore appropriate to exercise caution in prognostications of future growth. Public figures, for perfectly obvious reasons, have a vested interest in allaying public concern and massaging indicators of profound structural disturbance in economic and political systems. So how are we to interpret the significance of current assessments when we are often assured - as in the late 1920s that economic recovery, whether short, medium or long run, is around the corner?

To what extent is slowdown and unemployment a sign of major structural disequilibria? Views on this matter are divided along a wide continuum, perhaps reflecting the degree of incorporation of individual observers in the wider social process. In this Bulletin we offer a range of views on the topic - broad church, involving different levels of discourse, and drawing alternative policy prescriptions.

The canvas is the world political economy which can be roughly divided into three parts - the industrial market economies. Eastern European non-market economies, and the developing countries. For simplicity, we will often refer to these groups as West. East and South. This Bulletin focuses heavily on an analysis of West,