Despite their diverse origins - and despite the deliberate inclusion of one outspokenly sceptical view of aid - these eleven papers imply clear conclusions about aid-effectiveness. 1. Most aid raises growth and/or reduces poverty (Section II). 2. A disturbingly large, possibly rising, proportion does neither. 3. Partly, this is because much aid serves mostly donor interests. 4. Partly, it is because of inappropriate recipient policies (Section III). 5. Donors' interests impede their, and recipients', efforts to improve recipients' policies. 6. Each donor to, and each ministry in, a recipient country is imprisoned in a dilemma. By pursuing self-interested policies, it often harms aid-effectiveness in that country (for a//donors and ministries). By avoiding them, it may lose out to less scrupulous donors and ministries. 'Coordination' is not a magic solution (Section IV). 7. Macroeconomic conditions - unlike sector dialogues - seldom work, but may be implicit in a shift from project to programme aid. 8. That shift, and the associated aid shift to Africa, require better institutional and manpower aid, to maintain adequate effectiveness of other aid (Section V). 9. Many factors - the limitations of conditionality; the record of antipoverty aid; the record of inefficiency, inequality, and arguably near-scandal, in aid allocation among recipients - suggest that major country reallocations are the key to increased aid-effectiveness