Summary In a study of two villages in Andhra Pradesh, done in 1986/87, there were clear linkages between credit transactions and sales of crops. Producers from powerful classes were able to control the timing of sales of their crop, and hence obtain better prices; by contrast, petty commodity producers sold their groundnut crop soon after harvest, often to their moneylender. The latter obtained relatively low prices for their output. In one village, personal clientelization of borrowers ‘tied’ them to a particular merchant in a long‐term relationship involving interlinked transactions. In a more developed village nearby, with more competition, personalized clientage was less common. In both villages, small producers were forced, through a process of subtle manipulation, to sell groundnut at disadvantageous prices. Meanwhile, paddy (rice) was grown on a small scale by farmers, but they were not forced to sell that crop; instead they used it for home consumption. The article suggests ways of improving future research on power within such markets.