Crescêncio B.G. Pereira2 Alex Shankland3 and Euclides Gonçalves4
Abstract This article analyses the dynamic interactions between civil society organisations, local government, and the energy sector within three key energy-producing regions of Mozambique: Inhambane, Tete, and Cabo Delgado. It focuses on the challenges and opportunities for achieving a just energy transition in a political landscape prioritising investments in an energy matrix predominantly based on hydroelectric power, natural gas, and coal. Drawing on research in Mozambique on civic engagement and energy transition, the article puts forward three main propositions: (1) Mozambique’s dependency on fossil fuels and the slow expansion of renewable energy projects create tensions between the urgent need for energy access and global climate mitigation commitments; (2) the fragmentation of civic space limits the ability of local voices to influence policy decisions around transition; and (3) the creation of democratic engagement platforms would expand community participation and foster strategic alliances to address the rights of local communities.
Resumen Este artículo analiza las dinámicas de interacción entre organizaciones de la sociedad civil, gobiernos locales y el sector energético en tres regiones clave productoras de energía en Mozambique: Inhambane, Tete y Cabo Delgado. Analiza los desafíos y oportunidades de avanzar hacia una transición energética justa dentro de un marco político que privilegia la inversión en una matriz sustentada principalmente en la hidroelectricidad, el gas natural y el carbón.A partir de investigaciones llevadas a cabo en Mozambique sobre participación cívica y transición energética, el artículo presenta tres argumentos principales: (1) la dependencia de Mozambique de los combustibles fósiles y la lenta expansión de proyectos de energías renovables generan tensiones entre la necesidad urgente de acceso a la energía y los compromisos globales de mitigación climática; (2) la fragmentación del espacio cívico limita la capacidad de las voces locales para influir en las decisiones de política relacionadas con la transición; (3) la creación de plataformas de participación democrática permitiría ampliar la participación comunitaria y fomentar alianzas estratégicas para abordar los derechos de las comunidades locales.
Resumo Este artigo analisa as dinâmicas das interacções entre organizações da sociedade civil, governos locais e o sector energético em três regiões-chave produtoras de energia em Moçambique: Inhambane, Tete e Cabo Delgado. Focaliza-se nos desafios e nas oportunidades para alcançar uma transição energética justa, num contexto político que prioriza investimentos e numa matriz energética predominantemente baseada em energia hidroeléctrica, gás natural e carvão. Com base em pesquisas realizadas em Moçambique sobre engajamento cívico e transição energética, o artigo apresenta três ideias centrais: (1) a dependência de Moçambique em combustíveis fósseis e a lenta expansão de projectos de energia renovável criam tensões entre a necessidade urgente de acesso à energia e os compromissos globais de mitigação climática; (2) a fragmentação do espaço cívico limita a capacidade das vozes locais influenciarem decisões políticas sobre a transição; (3) a criação de plataformas de engajamento democrático expandiria a participação comunitária e promoveria alianças estratégicas para abordar os direitos das comunidades locais
Keywords just energy transition, civic space, community engagement, Mozambique.
Mozambique’s energy transition is being shaped by large-scale projects across its three main regions: natural gas in Inhambane (south), coal in Tete (centre), and liquefied natural gas (LNG) in Cabo Delgado (north) (Smith and Kirshner 2024; Sambo 2020), alongside slower and more limited progress in renewable energy sources and investments (Barreto and Fernandes 2014; Crudeli 2016; Nhambiu and Chichango 2024). While initial investments were largely concentrated on the exploitation of fossil fuels (Kirshner, Broto and Baptista 2020; Sambo 2020), renewable energy initiatives promoted by the Mozambican government have been gaining increasing prominence, particularly in underserved regions (Governo de Moçambique 2024). An example is the Metoro solar power plant in the Ancuabe district, approximately 90km from Pemba, the provincial capital of Cabo Delgado, for which project construction commenced in 2019, and it entered commercial operation in April 2022. With a production capacity of 41 megawatts, representing approximately 25 per cent of the electricity expected to be consumed in northern Mozambique (Assane 2023), the Metoro plant plays a crucial role in Mozambique’s energy matrix and is integrated into the national electricity distribution grid (Nyusi 2022).
Such investments remain highly vulnerable to climate change, as demonstrated by the impact of tropical cyclone Chido, which struck the north in mid-December 2024, severely affecting Cabo Delgado.5 The cyclone impacted approximately 272,000 people and caused widespread destruction (UN-OCHA 2025), and affected the electricity grid supplied by the state-owned company Electricidade de Moçambique (EDM), leaving approximately 200,000 consumers without access to electricity across the three northern provinces – Cabo Delgado, Nampula, and Niassa (Agência de Informação de Moçambique 2024). This situation has exacerbated the structural challenges in energy supply that the government of Mozambique has already acknowledged, such as an energy production capacity that remains below its potential, an inadequate and uneven energy infrastructure across urban and rural areas, and the limited integration of renewable and decentralised energy solutions (Fundação Mecanismo de Apoio à Sociedade Civil 2024; Governo de Moçambique 2024).
Yet climate-related disasters are only part of a broader and compounding set of challenges faced by Mozambique. The country is also grappling with armed conflict and a worsening political and socioeconomic situation, limiting efforts to develop energy projects. As Blanes, Rodrigues and Gonçalves (2023) note, extractive-led development has exacerbated geographic inequalities and local grievances, fuelling unrest in regions such as Cabo Delgado. The absence of procedural and distributive justice in the energy sector also weakens legitimacy and fragments civic engagement, posing significant barriers to a just energy transition (Castán Broto et al. 2018).
Since 2017, Mozambique’s northern region, particularly Cabo Delgado, has been the scene of a jihadist insurgency (Habibe, Forquilha and Pereira 2019; Morier-Genoud 2020).6 While analysts highlight a mix of internal and external factors driving the conflict emergence and escalation (Forquilha and Pereira 2022; Habibe et al. 2019), some perspectives point directly to resource distribution issues, including the exploitation of the Rovuma Basin’s gas fields, discovered in 2010 (Blanes et al. 2023; Ngoenha, do Amaral and Nhumaio 2020; Salite et al. 2021). The lack of local benefits from the gas fields has deepened grievances (Meek and Nene 2021). Furthermore, land expropriation for extractive industries, human rights violations, and police brutality have strained community–state relations (Feijó, Maqueni and Agy 2022). This scenario has exacerbated social discontent and frustrations, especially in a region already struggling with insecurity and multidimensional poverty, including energy poverty, as in Cabo Delgado (ibid.; Pereira et al. 2022), encouraging some to support or join the insurgency or flee their communities due to the conflict.
In October 2024, Mozambique faced an unprecedented post-electoral crisis, marked by protests alleging fraud in elections, reflecting widespread discontent with the worsening socioeconomic conditions (Chaimite 2025). The wave of protests has led some communities to initiate direct negotiations with energy companies, for example the South African oil and gas company Sasol in Inhambane, demanding a fairer distribution of the benefits derived from natural resource extraction through concrete local development initiatives (Vilanculos 2024). Youth have played a central role in these demands, calling for employment opportunities and targeted social investments in youth-oriented programmes as part of the company’s corporate social responsibility obligations (ibid.; AllAfrica 2021; Miguel 2021; da Conceição 2021). During the protests at the end of 2024, young people even succeeded in temporarily halting Sasol’s operations as a form of pressure to advance their claims (Integrity 2024).
It is worth noting that Sasol has been implementing Local Development Agreements (LDAs) as a mechanism to respond to community demands. In May 2025, the company signed a second five-year LDA with the government and local communities, building on the first agreement implemented from 2020 to 2025.The new commitment foresees an investment of US$43m on top of the US$20m disbursed under the initial agreement from 2020 (Integrity 2025; Sasol 2025). Despite Sasol’s commitment to social responsibility, the Mozambican government has come under strong criticism from the youth for its limited role in supporting local development. These criticisms are particularly acute considering the approximately US$38m in tax revenues that the state has collected from Sasol over the past decade, with little to no commensurate public investment made in the related local communities (Integrity 2025). It is also important to highlight that when local communities mobilise and protest, the government’s response has been characterised by violent repression and shrinking democratic space, reinforcing a historical pattern of repressive social control (Brito 2017; Brito et al. 2015).
The growing political instability in Mozambique, driven by protests and disputes over electoral results, has disrupted several initiatives related to its energy sector, including the research process underpinning this article, written under the Just Transition Learning Project, implemented since 2023 by the Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos (IESE) and the Institute of Development Studies (IDS), supported by the Ford Foundation.
Thus, in light of this complex scenario and recognising that ‘civil society engagement is essential to ensure that policies and projects meet the needs and expectations of citizens, promoting transparency and accountability’ (Governo de Moçambique 2024: 24), this article analyses the dynamics of interaction between civil society organisations (CSOs), local government, and the energy sector in Mozambique.
The analysis is based on insights from previous research on civic engagement and energy transition in Mozambique as well as three participatory workshops with CSOs on the subject, conducted between September 2023 and March 2024 in the country’s key energy-producing provinces – Inhambane, Tete, and Cabo Delgado – along with a fourth workshop in Maputo City, the country’s political and administrative hub for CSOs. A follow‑up workshop was held in April 2025 in Inhambane, aimed at strengthening strategic dialogue among CSOs from all three regions and Maputo City to enhance their engagement on energy transition issues with government authorities and energy companies.7
Thus, the article reflects on the conversations of two distinct groups of CSOs. The first operates from Maputo, where national policy decisions are shaped, while the second works directly in the southern, central, and northern provinces, engaging with affected communities, energy companies, and local governance structures. Both groups play a crucial role in advocating for transparency, social accountability, and equitable resource distribution, while empowering citizens to engage with state actors and the energy industry.
This article focuses on the challenges and opportunities for achieving a just energy transition in a closing civic space and a political landscape that prioritises investments in an energy matrix predominantly based on hydroelectric power, natural gas, and coal. It puts forward three main propositions: (1) Mozambique’s dependency on fossil fuels and the slow expansion of renewable energy projects create tensions between the urgent need for energy access and global climate mitigation commitments; (2) the fragmentation of civic space limits the ability of local voices to influence policy decisions and energy projects, thereby restricting community involvement in shaping the priorities of energy transition; and (3) the creation of democratic engagement platforms would expand community participation, foster strategic alliances among stakeholders at various levels, and strengthen inclusive dialogue to address not only economic and environmental needs but also the rights and priorities of local communities, who often feel marginalised in global climate agenda discussions.
Following this introduction (Section 1), the article is structured into five more sections. Section 2 offers a contextual overview of Mozambique’s energy sector, mirroring its historical development, policy frameworks, and the influence of cooperation partnerships on the public discourse surrounding energy transition. Section 3 addresses the experience of civil society actors in seeking opportunities to foster this democratic deliberation in a context where civic space is increasingly restricted. Section 4 analyses key barriers and opportunities for a just energy transition. Section 5 outlines pathways for enhancing civic participation in energy governance and promoting a more equitable and sustainable transition from the perspective of CSOs. Section 6 concludes.
With the beginning of gas exploration in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique entered the global debate on energy transition, understood as replacing fossil fuels with low-carbon energy sources (Agyeman, Bullard and Evans 2003; Bullard 2005; Abramsky 2010; Newell and Mulvaney 2013; van Veelen and van der Horst 2018; Newell 2021a, 2021b; Shukla et al. 2022).8 In 2021, the COP26 Climate Summit in Glasgow was marked by protests from European environmental activists against international funding to exploit Cabo Delgado’s natural gas reserves. These protests, in turn, sparked debates on social media in Mozambique, asserting the country’s right to exploit its natural resources (Pereira et al. 2022). The Mozambique government’s position aligns with other African civil society groups that challenge the energy transition proposal advocating for keeping fossil fuels underground. Given that Africa, on average, has the lowest per capita energy consumption, the lowest per capita income levels, and the smallest historical carbon footprint of any region in the world (Adow 2020), forgoing the revenues from fossil-fuel exploitation is seen as an unjust proposal.
Despite vast energy resources, deep regional disparities characterise Mozambique’s energy access landscape (Barreto and Fernandes 2014; Cotton, Kirshner and Salite 2021; Salite et al. 2021). Energy access across the country is unevenly distributed, with significantly higher coverage in the south compared to the central and northern regions. In the north, home to the largest natural gas reserves, only 30 per cent of households can access electricity; in the centre, which also hosts gas reserves, coal mines, and the Cahora Bassa Hydroelectric plant, the access rate is 27 per cent. In contrast, in the south, where political and economic power is concentrated in Maputo, and where gas has been exported from Inhambane’s coast for nearly 20 years, the access rate reaches 77 per cent (EDM 2021: 71).
These disparities reflect broader socio-political dynamics and feed into a perception of marginalisation in resource-rich yet underserved regions, as evidenced by public sentiment. An Afrobarometer survey carried out in 2024 revealed that the population aged 18–35 identify access to energy as the third of five most pressing challenges facing the country at 22 per cent of those surveyed – compared to access to water (37 per cent), unemployment (34 per cent), health (21 per cent), and then infrastructure in general (Mpako and Dryding 2024).
The country possesses substantial energy potential. Its hydropower capacity is estimated at 12,000MW (60,000GWh/year), complemented by 1,500MW from natural gas and 5,000MW from coal (Barreto and Fernandes 2014; Fundação Mecanismo de Apoio à Sociedade Civil 2024). For instance, in 2023, the country produced 19,753GWh, serving approximately 3.2 million consumers (Instituto Nacional de Estatística 2024). Hydropower alone could potentially supply over 9 million users annually at current consumption levels. However, energy access remains limited and unreliable due to outdated infrastructure, politicised tariffs, and institutional inefficiencies (Salite et al. 2021). Some experts forecast that domestic energy demand will grow by 8 per cent annually over the next 25 years, cautioning that reliance on hydropower increases vulnerability to climate change and emphasising the need to incorporate solar, wind, and biomass energy sources (Fundação Mecanismo de Apoio à Sociedade Civil 2024).
The surge in gas exploration has intensified the global debate on the role of this fossil fuel in the energy transition and the national debate on regional inequalities in Mozambique (Smith and Kirshner 2024; Wiegink 2018). The Natural Gas Master Plan highlights the strategic role of gas in industrialisation and employment generation aiming to contribute ‘to human capital development and the economy as a whole’ (Conselho de Ministros 2014: 21). The National Development Strategy (ENDE) 2025–2044 emphasises diversifying the energy mix by expanding renewable energy sources and promoting energy efficiency (Governo de Moçambique 2024) to lower production costs in key economic sectors, enhancing the competitiveness of national producers and attracting regional investments, while improving access to affordable and sustainable energy for the population.
The development of the energy sector in Mozambique is shaped by policies and strategies influenced by development partners, with the aim of supporting the country in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have been particularly committed to supporting legal and institutional reform in the electricity and fuel sub-sectors to reduce subsidies for downstream consumers. Bilateral donors, including the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), and the government agencies of the Netherlands and Norway, have been actively engaged in the off-grid solar sector (through initiatives such as the FCDO-funded BRILHO - Energy Africa Mozambique programme). USAID, although no longer present in Mozambique following US President Donald Trump’s withdrawal in March 2025 (Gould 2025), played a prominent role in advocating for electricity sector liberalisation and regulatory reform through the SPEED+programme.9 FCDO, GIZ, and the Netherlands government agency continue to support the expansion of off-grid electricity through different programmes.
The World Bank and the European Union (EU) have invested in supporting natural gas exploitation, seen as a ‘transition fuel’ with the potential to boost Mozambique’s development. Several renewable energy projects have accompanied this funding for gas projects.10 However, there is a notable imbalance in investment efforts. Gaventa notes that, by 2021, ‘Total international support for all renewable energy projects in Mozambique was USD 230 million, representing one-sixtieth of the volumes of public funding provided to Mozambique’s LNG project alone’ (2021: 19).
Fossil fuels have become central not only to energy planning but also to fiscal policy and development cooperation. Revenues from natural gas are framed as crucial for funding development initiatives (Adow 2020; Pereira et al. 2022). At COP26, then-prime minister Carlos Agostinho do Rosário emphasised the importance of gas projects for Mozambique’s socioeconomic development and advocated for a gradual energy transition, supported by international financing and technology transfers.
Since 2015, the IMF has publicly supported fuel price increases to eliminate what it considers a ‘costly, inefficient, and poorly targeted’ fuel subsidy (IMF 2015: 26). The IMF argues that adopting international reference prices with automatic monthly fuel price adjustments would help align incentives across the import system and reduce inefficiencies.
In their public statements, the IMF and the World Bank acknowledge the potential economic and political repercussions of higher energy prices. To offset the impact of price increases on vulnerable households, both institutions advocate for social transfers and allocation of tax benefits to expand energy service provision or investment in social sectors such as health and education (Nhete 2007; IMF 2015, 2016). So far, however, the proposed social support mechanisms for low-income families have been implemented inadequately, if at all (Brito 2017).
The World Bank supported the reform process that led to the new Petroleum Tax Law,11 which provides substantial subsidies for oil and gas exploration, including a hyper-accelerated depreciation rate along with a provision for losses of five consecutive years, and exemptions from Value Added Tax (VAT). Recently, the World Bank faced criticism for financing and providing technical assistance to the fossil-fuel industry in Mozambique (Mainhardt 2017, 2020; Sward et al. 2021).
Thus, the failure to materialise the benefits from the energy sector, coupled with the local population’s perception of an unfair distribution of resources generated from the sale of natural gas exploration rights, has fuelled political tensions that contributed to the ongoing armed conflict in Cabo Delgado, the leading producing province. Social protests in other resource-rich regions, such as Inhambane and Tete, further reflect these tensions.
Civic engagement in Mozambique’s energy sector is a relatively recent phenomenon (Gebreslassie and Cuvilas 2023), which emerged in response to institutional reforms such as decentralisation, market liberalisation, and public administration reform. The CSOs engaged in the energy sector have raised debates on energy issues, which gained visibility, particularly in Maputo. In Maputo, CSOs and the media in general have played an increasingly prominent role in raising issues of energy justice and governance of energy resources in the public sphere (Barreto and Fernandes 2014; Gebreslassie and Cuvilas 2023; Hossain et al. 2021; Pereira et al. 2022).
In Mozambique, civic engagement is structured across three interrelated yet distinct spaces, each reflecting specific political, institutional, and geographical dynamics (Pereira et al. 2022). Firstly, the central space, concentrated in Maputo, is led by think tanks and advocacy organisations that operate primarily through knowledge production, policy monitoring, and indirect influence strategies. These actors typically adopt a technocratic approach and maintain an ambivalent relationship with the state: critical but largely non-confrontational, which allows them a limited degree of institutional autonomy.
Secondly, the local space, concentrated at the province and district headquarters, is characterised by the dense presence of state and party actors, where subnational elites exert tight control over civil society activity. In this setting, civic initiatives are often restricted, co-opted, or instrumentalised, exposing significant power asymmetries between the state and social actors, with direct consequences for the autonomy and effectiveness of local associations.
Finally, the grass-roots space, at the village level, emerges as a site of everyday resistance and claim-making, where local actors, often operating outside formal institutional frameworks, mobilise around land disputes, resettlement processes, demands for compensation, and access to benefits from energy projects. While fragmented, this space is a fertile ground for community mobilisation and the articulation of alternative forms of citizenship, which remain largely invisible within formal participatory mechanisms.
The differentiated levels of civic engagement in Mozambique reflect asymmetries in political power and decision-making over the country’s energy development pathways. As noted in Kirshner and Power (2015: 76), without meaningful efforts by the state and companies to engage communities, mechanisms for local participation in energy decision-making have remained ‘minimal’.
In general, civic engagement tends to be fragmented and highly constrained in repressive and semi-authoritarian contexts such as Mozambique (Brito 2017; EIU 2025; Toepler et al. 2020). Participation is not determined by the formal existence of participatory tools alone but is shaped by how organisations interact with state structures and navigate political constraints (Forquilha and Orre 2011; Sanches and Júlio 2021; Toepler et al. 2020; Topsøe-Jensen et al. 2016).
The state strategically categorises civil society actors: those that claim rights, question official policies, or demand accountability are more likely to face repression, either overt, through legal restrictions and intimidation, or covert, through marginalisation and funding barriers. In contrast, service delivery organisations aligned with government priorities tend to be tolerated or supported (Toepler et al. 2020). Although the legal framework outlines mechanisms for consultation and dialogue, in practice, repression, co-optation, and political control remain central to the governance of civic space, particularly when strategic economic interests are at stake (Forquilha and Orre 2011; Orre and Rønning 2017).
Our research in Mozambique confirms that while CSOs based in Maputo often manage to navigate relatively easily, thos operating far from the capital, especially in remote or resource‑rich areas, encounter substantial challenges. These include a lack of technical and financial resources, pressure from local authorities, and institutional fragility (Blanes et al. 2023; Pereira et al. 2022; Pereira and Forquilha 2020; see also Topsøe‑Jensen et al. 2016).
Institutions such as IESE, the Centro de Integridade Pública (CIP), the Instituto para Democracia Multipartidária (IMD), and the Fundação Mecanismo para a Sociedade Civil (Fundação MASC) have played central roles in framing critical debates on energy governance and the extractive sector’s impact on the national economy. In the context of inflated expectations of rapid growth due to investments in coal, oil, and gas, these organisations have exposed the disconnect between the prevailing energy model and the material needs of the Mozambican population living in poverty (Castel-Branco 2014, 2015; Mosca and Selemane 2012). Energy infrastructure and production systems are primarily designed to serve extractive and export-oriented logic, with limited domestic economic integration (Castel-Branco 2010; Sambo 2020). These investments are primarily designed to support export-led growth, without generating significant multiplier effects in the domestic economy (Kirshner and Power 2015).
Despite these efforts, the energy debate remains confined to a small network of civil society actors in Maputo. These organisations also attempt to influence local dynamics, often through capacity building of grass-roots groups. However, both civil society and government actors recognise that the sector’s technical complexity and restricted nature limit opportunities for broad-based participation. Mozambique’s voluntary adoption of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2003, supported by the World Bank, the IMF, and the former UK Department for International Development (now FCDO), provided an entry point for civil society involvement in natural resource governance. Organisations such as CIP, IESE, IMD, and Fundação MASC have operated relatively autonomously, engaging in empirical research and/or advocacy approaches. These approaches have granted them conditional legitimacy, tolerated by the state provided that existing power structures remain unchallenged.
Nevertheless, these initiatives have not reversed the centralisation of decision-making nor ensured equitable redistribution of the gains from megaprojects. The disclosure of previously confidential oil and gas contracts is an achievement secured through coalitions led by the CIP and supported by transnational advocacy networks. However, even in these cases, civic engagement has struggled to translate transparency into substantive policy reform (Awortwi and Nuvunga 2019; Mosse and Selemane 2008). Still, CSOs have maintained pressure on critical issues such as the management of energy revenues and the role of extractive industries in diversifying the national economy (Castel-Branco 2014).
At a subnational level, especially in areas directly affected by large-scale energy projects, civic space is significantly more restricted. Local authorities often act as gatekeepers of information and engagement, and CSOs in these areas face limited resources, political capture, and frequent intimidation (Salomão 2020). Engagement in these contexts tends to be reactive and confrontational, driven by shared experiences of exclusion, dispossession, and broken promises. Protest, community mobilisation, and demands for justice regarding energy access, environmental damage, resettlement, and land compensation are the primary forms of expression.
Grass-roots actors, community committees, traditional authorities, and emerging local activists often operate under precarious conditions and are rarely treated as legitimate stakeholders by companies or the state. The absence of institutional mechanisms for dialogue, combined with organisational weakness and lack of funding, undermines their influence. These fragmented efforts further exacerbate political inequalities and reinforce the concentration of decision-making power in Maputo.
In this environment, Mozambique’s energy transition risks replicating historical patterns of exclusion, weakening its legitimacy and political viability. So-called ‘community engagement’ in extractive projects frequently ends in a one‑way communication, where communities are merely informed of decisions made elsewhere, with no real opportunity for input (Blanes et al. 2023). In a context where land remains state-owned and citizens only hold usage rights, projects are often framed as non-negotiable national imperatives, with communities expected to adapt. This systematic marginalisation has fuelled local grievances and, in some cases, violent unrest.
However, organisations based in Maputo have attempted to intervene at the subnational level. Attempts occur in three primary ways. Firstly, through information and awareness campaigns aimed at empowering affected communities to assert their rights, claim benefits, and engage with relevant legislation (Castel‑Branco 2008; Mosse and Selemane 2008). Secondly, by pressuring companies to uphold mitigation measures and guarantee fair compensation. Centro Terra Viva (CTA) and SEKELEKANI (a communication and media advocacy organisation) have been central in supporting community access to resettlement information, voicing citizen concerns, and publicly denouncing abuses. These groups, however, have been subject to surveillance and harassment by local authorities (Salomão 2020). Thirdly, environmental organisations such as Justiça Ambiental (Já!) and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) have advocated against fossil-fuel dependency, promoting sustainable energy alternatives aligned with climate justice principles. In addition, it is observed that events in the energy sector have been moving faster than civil society’s capacity to create awareness and support communities (Crudeli 2016; Pereira et al. 2022). Thus, the discontinuity in civic interventions has disrupted local capacity‑building processes, weakening the long-term sustainability of community engagement in an already centralised political context.
Given the complexity and novelty of energy transition issues in Mozambique (Barreto and Fernandes 2014; Gebreslassie and Cuvilas 2023), civic involvement is needed across all levels. However, current dynamics reveal a weak articulation between national and grass-roots actors. CSOs working with communities often promote rights-based and environmental agenda shaped by local and international experience. In contrast, local populations tend to focus on immediate livelihood needs and respond to perceived injustices with sporadic mobilisation. As Pereira et al. (2022) note, these tensions are heightened by foreign investors who appear to benefit disproportionately from land and energy projects, reinforcing the sense of exclusion. While global debates on climate change and energy transition set priorities and allocate resources in the global North (Newell 2021a, 2021b), Mozambique remains on the periphery (Newell et al. 2022). The government, national CSOs, and the broader population face significant barriers in accessing and influencing these strategic arenas.
4.1 Tensions and contradictions
As in many resource-rich developing countries, Mozambique’s energy transition is marked by contradictions (Newell 2021a, 2021b). While the exploitation of natural gas, coal, and hydropower is often presented as a driver of economic growth, the distribution of benefits remains highly uneven. Large multinational corporations and political elites gain disproportionate advantages, while local communities face deepening inequalities, environmental degradation, and social displacement (Mahumane and Mulder 2016; Rantala 2023).
Since the early 2000s, in Inhambane, the Pande‑Temane natural gas exploration project, operated by Sasol, has contributed to increased revenue generation in Mozambique, but the gas has been exported to South Africa at low prices (Smith and Kirshner 2024). At the same time, internally, the expansion of production has predominantly benefited political elites and private companies through lucrative contracts concluded without transparency, configuring a mechanism for transferring public income to the private domain (CIP 2017; Salimo, Buur and Macuane 2020).
Promises to use the gas extracted in Inhambane for the domestic market have been deferred over the years, with most of the resources being directed for export and only a minimal portion used internally (CIP 2013). Nearly two decades later, a new perspective has emerged, exemplified by the construction of the Temane thermal power plant, which aims to generate approximately 450MW of electricity, the largest power plant to be built in Mozambique since independence, through an investment estimated at US$1bn (Nyusi 2022). Although this plant was expected to supply energy to the country in early 2025 (Mbinza 2024), to date, its operationalisation remains pending. Local communities in Pande and Temane protest against Sasol, demanding more significant investment in local development (Checo 2024; da Conceição 2021). According to workshop participants, these protests also denounce political practices prioritising external interests and elites to the detriment of local communities.
The prioritisation of private interests and contracts concluded without transparency highlights governance failures and exacerbates inequalities, especially in the communities directly affected by gas exploration. During the workshop held in Maputo in March 2024, a representative of a CSO in the Govuro district of Inhambane summed up local frustration when he said:
Yes, we need the gas so that we can have some development. However, even if the companies come, they are unlikely to employ many unemployed Mozambicans. [...] This makes the population angry.
In Tete Province, coal mining by multinational companies such as Brazilian Vale and its Indian successors (International Coal Ventures Private Limited (ICVL), Vulcan International, and Jindal) has aggravated the precarious situation of the resettled communities who have lost their livelihoods. At the workshop held in Tete in November 2023, a participant from Cateme, the largest resettlement community created by Vale in the Moatize district, described the situation: ‘Our families were resettled in places with no conditions for survival. Our dreams were forgotten, as were our promises of a better future.’ Many families resettled in Cateme, despite the basic infrastructure offered by Vale, ended up abandoning their homes and seeking remote areas where access to fertile land and water offered better possibilities for survival (Lesutis 2019).
However, the largest national energy production company, Hidroeléctrica de Cahora Bassa (Cahora Bassa Hydroelectric, HCB), located in the town of Songo, represents a relative exception, being recognised by workshop participants as the one that invests the most in local projects and generates jobs for local communities (Kirshner et al. 2020). However, this recognition does not eliminate a paradox that has persisted since HCB began operating at full capacity in the late 1990s (Isaacman 2021): much of the energy generated is exported to South Africa, while Mozambican households struggle with electricity access. As Kirshner et al. (2020) also note, Songo is perceived as well organised with improved living standards for HCB employees; but the benefits of the dam remain concentrated among a narrow segment, while surrounding areas continue to face exclusion from electricity provision and other essential services, despite the symbolic national pride often associated with the project; as they observe, ‘In the surrounding villages beyond the perimeter road, the streets are dark at night’ (ibid.: 12).
Resolution 52/2023 shows an even more significant disparity between urban areas with 73 per cent access and rural areas where only 5 per cent of homes are electrified (Republic of Mozambique 2023). According to workshop participants, this inequality reinforces widespread distrust of government programmes such as ‘Energy for All’.12 In addition, it is important to note that at the time of the HCB dam construction, between 1969 and 1974, there were forced and unjust resettlements and significant ecological impacts (Isaacman 2021). These historical issues raised concerns among workshop participants that the new Mphanda Nkuwa dam construction project in Tete Province, currently in the investment mobilisation phase, could repeat the mistakes of the past (ibid.; Mutemba 2023).
In Cabo Delgado, the insurgency by the Al-Shabaab group, which began in 2017 (Habibe et al. 2019), coincided with the preparation of gas megaprojects in the Rovuma Basin, led by TotalEnergies, Eni, and ExxonMobil. While Eni began offshore gas exports in November 2022, the postponement of ExxonMobil and TotalEnergies onshore plans aggravated the frustration of some segments of the communities who saw their expectations of benefits postponed indefinitely. Despite this, the conflict has driven the development of resilience initiatives supported by investments from international partners. For example, in response to the suspension of food aid, the World Food Programme (WFP) implemented clean energy solutions, such as solar-powered irrigation systems in resettlement areas for those displaced by the conflict. According to workshop participants, these initiatives represent a promising opportunity for serious investment in renewable energy, especially in remote areas, contributing to income generation and improving living conditions in affected communities.
4.2 Transparency and inclusion
In Mozambique, energy sector initiatives are largely designed in a centralised manner, with limited participation from local communities, particularly the most vulnerable (Mahumane and Mulder 2019; Ugembe, Brito and Inglesi-Lotz 2022). This top-down logic raises concerns about transparency and social exclusion in decision-making processes. Current policies and practices perpetuate the concentration of power within state institutions, and lack clear and operational mechanisms to ensure affected communities’ involvement and promote truly inclusive and accountable energy governance (Blanes et al. 2023; Kirshner et al. 2020; Newell et al. 2022).
In our research, participants from all the provinces covered by the workshops highlighted the lack of transparency in negotiations between companies, government, and communities, and the exclusion of local communities from decision-making processes. The LDAs and memoranda of understanding, designed to channel part of the profits from energy exploitation into social investment in communities, were criticised for their opacity and ineffectiveness, generating social discontent. This discontent stems from inadequate consultations and the lack of clear information and transparency in the compensation intended for communities.
Participants expressed frustration over the ongoing confusion surrounding the origin and responsibility for the material and financial resources directed at their communities, whether these stem from government or corporate social responsibility initiatives, or other entities involved in resource extraction. During the workshop held in Vilankulo in April 2025, a representative of a CSO in Pande, Inhambane Province, said,
We’re being treated like a basketball, sometimes it’s the government, sometimes it’s the company. In the end, no one takes responsibility. Everything arrives with a partnership label, but no one explains what comes from the company and what comes from the state. So, we don’t know who to turn to when maintenance is needed. They build things we never asked for, while we still lack electricity and proper roads.
This confusion is compounded by the absence of a clear and participatory strategy for prioritising investments based on the actual needs of the communities. As a result, many social projects and services implemented end up poorly aligned with local priorities and often fail to produce a lasting impact.
The lack of access to transparent information on the use of the tax contribution (2.75 per cent) for the exploitation of energy resources also reinforces workshop participants’ distrust and limits the effectiveness of these funds in local development. It was pointed out that the lack of monitoring and accountability mechanisms further undermines community trust in the government and companies. For example, one participant confirmed other studies (Salomão 2020) at the workshop held in Vilankulo in October 2023, expressing his frustration:
But what is the role of the state? It seems that the state is distancing itself. As some colleagues have mentioned, resources, such as gas in Inhassoro and Govuro, should be seen as a gift to these communities, something that makes a difference. For example, local young people could have access to funds to develop entrepreneurial activities or even scholarships. This could transform the local reality and change the face of Inhassoro and Govuro.
Another aspect criticised during the workshops concerns the neglect of cultural aspects, such as the use of local languages in negotiations, the preservation of cultural heritage, and respect for sacred sites such as cemeteries, which aggravate conflicts and deepen the feeling of exclusion among communities.
4.3 Energy resources and climate impacts
Mozambique is exposed to environmental and social challenges linked to the large-scale exploitation of energy resources and the accelerating impacts of climate change (Schulman 2023; Uamusse, Tussupova and Persson 2020). These pressures are particularly in regions hosting extractive projects, where weak governance frameworks often fail to ensure environmental safeguards and equitable benefit sharing (Blanes et al. 2023; Lesutis 2019; Meek and Nene 2021; Mosca and Selemane 2012).
During our research in Inhambane, workshop participants reported that Sasol’s extraction of natural gas has cause damage to the environment, including the destruction of biodiversity and the marine ecosystem, which negatively impacts the livelihoods of fishing and farming communities and damages local tourism. At the same time, the air pollution generated by industrial operations also raises public health concerns.
A woman from Pande who participated in the workshop held in Vilankulo in April 2025 summarised as follows:
The gas exploration is bringing many negative impacts on the environment. We no longer have as many fish as before, there are areas where we can no longer fish, and this affects our families who depend on it. Our agriculture fields are also producing less.
A similar situation occurs in Tete, where coal mining has caused soil degradation and contamination of water sources, directly affecting local agriculture. At the Vilankulo workshop in April 2025, a woman resettled from the mining area of Moatize in Tete said:
The companies take everything away and leave only destruction in our lands. Then, they say we have to adapt when there’s a cyclone. But how can we adapt if we don’t even have electricity or a house or food?
In Cabo Delgado, although offshore gas exploration is more recent, the impact of the armed conflict has to some extent paralysed most economic activity, especially agriculture and fishing, in several affected areas, forcing communities to rely on food aid and resilience programmes to cope with both the conflict and frequent climate shocks. As a participant from Cabo Delgado pointed out at the Vilankulo workshop in April 2025,
The war has already taken everything. Then the rains come and wash away our homes and fields. So we’re left just waiting for help from others. We can’t do anything anymore, not even fish or farm.
Environmental and social challenges in Mozambique are exacerbated by the devastating impacts of extreme weather events, whose frequency and intensity have increased due to unsustainable global energy exploitation practices. These climate crises worsen the vulnerability of local communities. They are a recurring topic at the annual meetings of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, where global measures for reducing toxic gas emissions and advancing the energy transition are discussed and agreed upon. Mozambique plans to invest US$73bn in its Energy Transition Strategy by 2050 (Integrity 2023).
Workshop participants emphasised that a just energy transition will only be viable by including local communities, ensuring respect for their rights. They presented concrete suggestions to address the identified challenges, highlighting three key pillars for transforming them into opportunities.
The first aspect concerns the inclusion of communities in decision-making processes, the strengthening of CSOs, and the formation of strategic partnerships to ensure respect for community rights and an equitable distribution of the benefits of the energy transition. To this end, transparency must be a fundamental principle, with CSOs advocating for the interests and resilience of communities. Moreover, investment in capacity building is essential, along with the allocation of financial resources through funding mechanisms accessible to local organisations, which are often marginalised by the dominant service delivery logic in Mozambique. Creating dialogue space between CSOs, the government, and energy sector companies is crucial. Strengthening collaboration between international and local organisations is also important to enhance the effectiveness of projects and ensure that benefits reach communities. One participant summarised this need at the workshop held in Maputo in March 2024:
Only with a strong civil society can we pressure the government and companies to respect our rights. Today, we already have the Energy Transition Strategy. It is recent. As civil society, we need to monitor its implementation.
The second point concerns environmental responsibility and damage remediation. According to workshop participants, energy sector companies must be held accountable for the socioenvironmental impacts they cause and should adopt concrete mitigation and remediation measures, such as reforestation and the restoration of degraded ecosystems. Strict environmental oversight is a government obligation at all levels, ensuring companies fulfil their sustainability commitments. As one participant emphasised at the Maputo workshop, ‘We cannot continue destroying nature without thinking about future generations’.
Finally, the third element relates to economic diversification and local clean energy solutions. Participants stressed that the energy transition must be accompanied by a strategy that promotes the development of sectors such as tourism, agriculture, and small local industries, creating more growth opportunities and reducing dependence on energy resource exports. Additionally, they highlighted the importance of adapting clean energy initiatives to the needs and characteristics of communities. For example, at the Cabo Delgado workshop in November 2024, some participants criticised the use of solar stoves imported from other countries as substitutes for charcoal-burning stoves in vulnerable communities, arguing that these technologies ‘do not meet local realities’. This underscores the need to align clean energy projects with the socioeconomic and cultural contexts in beneficiary regions.
While fossil fuels have dominated the political discourse in Mozambique, external actors have promoted the integration of renewable energies by supporting projects and influencing energy sector policies. Consequently, electricity and renewable energies have become central components in the country’s energy policies and plans, including the Energy Transition Strategy. As the debate on energy transition intensifies, citizens and CSOs recognise the need to develop adequate capacities in the complex energy sector to engage in vibrant activism advocating for a just energy transition. Such activism must overcome challenges related to the trend of shrinking civic space observed in Mozambique in recent years (Topsøe-Jensen et al. 2016; Pereira and Forquilha 2020; Pereira, Forquilha and Shankland 2021; Pereira et al. 2022).
Concerns about increased control over CSOs have intensified with a proposed regulation requiring semi-annual narrative and financial reports under penalty of closure. Former president Filipe Nyusi justified the measure as a mechanism to ensure transparency and combat financial crimes.13 However, the lack of public debate has led civil society sectors to interpre it as an attempt to ‘silence civil society organisations’ and ‘close democracy’ (Silva 2022). However, during the inaugural ceremony of new Mozambican president Daniel Francisco Chapo in January 2025, he referred to social justice and civic space, raising expectations among some observers. But in the context of enduring authoritarian practices, the realisation of these aspirations will depend on whether such rhetoric is followed by concrete institutional reform and a shift in power dynamics.
Generally, our research in Mozambique shows that social and climate justice issues must consider the national political context and energy poverty. So far, discussions on the topic have primarily remained within political power circles, sidelining the voices of citizens who often struggle to relate to the global climate agenda debate. The narratives of civil society representatives from Inhambane, Tete, Cabo Delgado, and Maputo on energy justice illustrate this, revealing that the pursuit of climate justice with social justice for Mozambique requires a combination of synergies between government, energy sector companies, civil society, and international partners at different levels to meet the needs of citizens while pursuing sustainable local development.
However, creating these synergies will only be possible by overcoming the gaps in citizen representation and the barriers to participation faced by Mozambican CSOs. The CSOs need to engage across multiple levels of decision-making, from local communities and national institutions to regional platforms and international arenas, to ensure that the voices of remote communities affected by fossil-fuel extraction and residents of impoverished urban neighbourhoods in Maputo, where energy remains costly and unreliable, are represented. This multi-scalar engagement is essential to access the closed deliberative spaces where national energy policies are shaped and transnational actors determine the flow of financial resources. Our research makes clear that the energy transition in Mozambique presents an opportunity to promote social, economic, and environmental justice. However, its success depends on actions that ensure the inclusion, transparency, and participation of local communities. The importance of strengthening civic engagement, holding companies accountable for their impacts, and ensuring governance committed to public interests was highlighted during the workshops. The need to formulate public policies in the energy sector that consider local specificities and implement practical solutions tailored to the real needs of communities was also emphasised.
1 This issue of the IDS Bulletin was supported in part by a Ford Foundation grant entitled ‘Learning at the Intersections of Just Transitions: Spaces for Engagement, Voices from the Margins and Cross-Sectoral Alliances in Resource-Rich Countries of the Global South’. The British Academy also provided earlier support for the project ‘Making Space for Dialogue on Just Transitions in Africa’s Oil and Gas Producing Regions’ (2022) which helped to lay the foundation for much of this work. The opinions expressed are the authors’ own and do not reflect the views of the funders.
2 Crescêncio B.G. Pereira, researcher, Athari, Mozambique.
3 Alex Shankland, Research Fellow, Institute of Development Studies, UK.
4 Euclides Gonçalves, researcher, Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos (IESE), Mozambique.
5 Over the past decade, Mozambique has been increasingly affected by the impacts of climate change, experiencing a series of severe cyclones, including Dineo in 2017 and Freddy in 2023 in the south; Idai in 2019 in the central region (one of the most destructive cyclones ever recorded in the Southern Hemisphere); and Kenneth in 2019 in the north, the first event of its kind in that region in over 60 years. All of these events have had devastating effects, resulting in loss of life, mass displacement, and widespread damage to infrastructure and livelihoods.
6 The group is known by local communities as ‘Al-Shabaab’, which means ‘youth’ (Habibe et al. 2019). The group’s violent actions have triggered a severe humanitarian crisis, resulting in thousands of deaths and the displacement of nearly 1 million people (European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations 2023).
7 We thank the participants of the workshops whose valuable insights informed the development of this text.
8 It is worth mentioning that over the past two decades, Mozambique has attracted investment in fossil fuels, particularly coal and natural gas (Sambo 2020).
9 SPEED+ = Supporting the Policy Environment for Economic Development Plus.
10 See, for example, GET FiT Mozambique and GET.invest Mozambique.
11 See Boletim Da República.
12 A Government of Mozambique programme, implemented by the Fundo de Energia (FUNAE), the national energy fund, aiming to ensure universal access to energy in the country by 2030.
13 It should be noted that international assessments of civic space in Mozambique report this increase in state control over dissenting voices in the media and CSOs that advocate for citizens’ rights (see Newell et al. 2022).
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© 2025 The Authors. IDS Bulletin © Institute of Development Studies | DOI: 10.19088/1968-2025.142 This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence (CC BY), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original authors and source are credited and any modifications or adaptations are indicated.
The IDS Bulletin is published by Institute of Development Studies, Library Road, Brighton, BN1 9RE, UK. This article is part of IDS Bulletin Vol. 56 No. 2 November 2025 ‘Struggles for Justice in the Energy Transition: Voices from the Front Lines’; the Introduction is also recommended reading.