Anabel Marín2
Abstract Argentina and Chile have emerged as key suppliers of critical minerals essential to the global green transition. Yet the expansion of mineral extraction in both countries has triggered widespread socioenvironmental conflict. This article examines the scale, drivers, and outcomes of civil society resistance to mining, based on a review of over 180 sources and original mapping of 36 conflict cases. It argues that these conflicts are not isolated or episodic, but pervasive, politically significant, and increasingly influential in shaping the strategies for a just transition. Led by diverse actors – indigenous communities, local assemblies, non-governmental organisations, and municipal governments – resistance has often succeeded in blocking projects, prompting legal reforms, and generating bottom-up innovations. While resistance highlights failures in current governance models, it also advances alternative visions rooted in territorial justice and democratic participation. Civil society resistance should be recognised not as a barrier but as a potential catalyst for institutional and policy transformation.
Resumen Argentina y Chile se han consolidado como proveedores clave de minerales críticos esenciales para la transición energética global. Sin embargo, la expansión de la actividad minera en ambos países ha generado amplios conflictos socioambientales. Este artículo analiza la escala, las causas y los resultados de la resistencia de la sociedad civil a la minería, a partir de una revisión de más de 180 fuentes y un mapeo de 36 casos de conflicto. Sostiene que estos conflictos no son episodios aislados, sino fenómenos generalizados, políticamente significativos y cada vez más influyentes en la configuración de estrategias para una transición justa. Lideradas por actores diversos —comunidades indígenas, asambleas locales, organizaciones no gubernamentales y gobiernos municipales—, estas resistencias han logrado en muchoscasos frenar proyectos, impulsar reformas legales y generar innovaciones desde abajo. Si bien estas resistencias ponen en evidencia las fallas de los modelos de gobernanza actuales, también proponen estrategias alternativas basadas en la justicia territorial y la participación democrática. Se propone por lo tanto que las mismas no deben entenderse como un obstáculo, sino como un posible catalizador de transformaciones institucionales y políticas.
Resumo A Argentina e o Chile emergiram como fornecedores centrais de minerais críticos essenciais à transição energética global. No entanto, a expansão da extracção mineira em ambos os países desencadeou conflitos socioambientais generalizados. Este artigo analisa a escala, os factores determinantes e os resultados da resistência da sociedade civil à mineração, com base numa revisão de mais de 180 fontes e no mapeamento original de 36 casos de conflito. Defende-se que estes conflitos não são isolados ou episódicos, mas sim omnipresentes, politicamente significativos e cada vez mais influentes na definição das estratégias para uma transição justa. Liderada por actores diversos – comunidades indígenas, assembleias locais, organizações não-governamentais e governos municipais – a resistência conseguiu, em muitos casos, bloquear projectos, promover reformas legais e gerar inovações de base. Embora revele falhas nos actuais modelos de governação, esta resistência também projecta visões alternativas, assentes na justiça territorial e na participação democrática. A resistência da sociedade civil deve ser reconhecida não como um obstáculo, mas como um potencial catalisador de transformação institucional e política.
Keywords civic mobilisation, just energy transitions, mineral extraction, social conflict, environmental justice, resource governance, civil society participation, green industrial policy, critical minerals, Argentina and Chile.
1 Introduction
Argentina and Chile are home to some of the world’s largest reserves of lithium and copper – minerals critical to the energy transition. With relatively liberalised and open mining sectors, these two countries aim to become key suppliers of these minerals for the global energy transition. Yet this strategic positioning is increasingly marked by tension. In both countries, mining projects face sustained, visible, and often highly effective resistance from civil society actors. Communities, indigenous groups, environmental organisations, and local governments are challenging extractive initiatives on environmental, territorial, political, and epistemic grounds. These dynamics make Argentina and Chile important cases for understanding how civil society resistance is reshaping extractive governance today.
This article explores the scale, characteristics, and implications of these conflicts. Drawing on an original review of existing studies and policy documents, alongside empirical analysis of emblematic cases and geographical mapping of conflicts, it asks four guiding questions:
1 How widespread is opposition to mineral extraction in Argentina and Chile?
2 Who is resisting, through what strategies, and whose voices are represented in the resistance?
3 How have governments and companies responded?
4 What are the implications of these dynamics for justice, governance, and transformation?
The literature review was based on a systematic Scopus search (2010–24) for academic work on mining conflicts and community participation in Argentina and Chile. From 182 results, 66 were excluded as irrelevant and 83 for lacking conflict focus, leaving 33 papers for detailed review. An additional seven were manually added to cover key conflict cases not captured in the initial search. The geographical mapping draws on two types of data: (1) official sources on mining activities, including Chile’s Faenas Mineras (Ministry of Mining), Proyecto SEA (Servicio de Evaluación Ambienta), and Sociedad Nacional de Minería (SONAMI), and Argentina’s SIACAM (Ministry of Mining) and the Extractives Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) portal; and (2) conflict observatories such as the Environmental Justice Atlas, Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros en América Latina, Instituto Nacional de Derechos Humanos (Chile), and the Observatorio de Conflictos Sociales (Argentina). Each mine in Chile and Argentina was geolocated and characterised by the actors involved, forms of resistance, and institutional responses.
This article draws on recent literature on just transitions and transformations to frame the analysis of conflicts in the mineral sector. While ‘transitions’ often refer to sectoral and technological shifts towards low-carbon systems, ‘transformations’ imply deeper, systemic reconfigurations of political, economic, and social relations (Scoones, Newell and Leach 2020; Newell, Price and Daley 2024). The concept of justice is used here in its multidimensional sense, encompassing procedural justice (who participates in decision-making), recognitional justice (whose rights, knowledges, and identities are valued), and distributional justice (how benefits and harms are shared) (Newell et al. 2024; Sovacool et al. 2019). These dimensions are interconnected and frequently contested in extractive conflicts.
Civic power refers to the collective capacity of civil society actors to assert rights, challenge dominant governance arrangements, and negotiate more just and democratic terms for mineral extraction, thereby shaping both the justice and political viability of the energy transition (Gaventa 2006; Marín and Palazzo 2025). Comparative research suggests that this is exercised in different ways depending on the context. Legal tools can open pathways to recognition where institutions are responsive, while direct protest often proves more effective in contexts of exclusion (Akchurin 2020; Temper et al. 2020). This framing informs the empirical sections that follow, particularly the discussion of alternative governance practices and justice claims emerging from conflicts (Newell et al. 2024; Temper et al. 2020). The empirical evidence analysed suggests that civil society resistance to mineral extraction in Argentina and Chile is neither isolated nor marginal. It is widespread, persistent, and diverse in form – ranging from legal action and direct protest to participatory monitoring and municipal bans. These conflicts are not only reactions to specific projects or environmental harms but responses to broader concerns about exclusion, legitimacy, and the governance of shared resources. They challenge the models of development that have long underpinned mineral extraction in both countries and demand new forms of accountability and responsiveness.
While the primary contribution is empirical, the article situates the findings within a growing literature that views socioenvironmental conflict not only as a challenge but also as a potential catalyst for institutional and political change (Temper and Del Bene 2016; Walter and Wagner 2024). Recent work has distinguished between instrumental, symbolic, and transformative approaches to participation in resource governance, highlighting the limits of the first two in addressing existing conflicts and promoting significant changes (Marín and Cremaschi 2025a). Although these frameworks are not the central focus of this analysis, I return to them in the discussion and conclusion to reflect on how resistance may contribute to the reconfiguration of extractive institutions and decision-making processes and to ideas and practices of justice in the transition.
Argentina and Chile offer valuable cases for understanding the tensions surrounding critical mineral extraction in the context of the global energy transition. Both countries play an increasingly strategic role as suppliers of lithium and copper – key inputs for low-carbon technologies. At the same time, they share a long history of socioenvironmental resistance and state responses ranging from participatory reforms to authoritarian measures. These conflicts are shaped by a colonial legacy that continues to be reproduced through market-based governance arrangements, reinforcing territorial inequalities and exclusion – dynamics common to many low- and middle-income countries now called upon to supply the raw materials for a global green transformation.
Despite these commonalities, the comparison is analytically productive: Chile has long been a prominent mining country, while Argentina is a more recent and still-contested entrant, emblematic of other resource-rich but economically and institutionally uneven contexts. The contrast between their institutional frameworks and development trajectories in relation to mining allows us to better understand how civil society actors engage with – and reshape – the terms of extractive governance in different types of settings.
The article is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the political and economic context of extractive governance in both countries. Section 3 characterises conflicts based on the empirical analysis, examining the spread, actors, demands, strategies, responses, and impacts. Section 4 analyses governmental and corporate responses. Section 5 reflects on the potential for transformative responses and rethinks the role of conflict in shaping more legitimate and democratic approaches to mineral governance. Section 6 concludes with broader reflections on justice, sustainability, and future research directions.
2 The political and economic context
2.1 The green push and the extractive imperative
The clean energy transition has triggered a global race for critical minerals. Lithium, copper, nickel, and rare earth elements are central to energy storage, electric vehicles, and renewable technologies (IEA 2024). Although the precise direction of this race will be shaped by political developments in major consumer countries – such as the United States, China, and the European Union, particularly regarding critical mineral sourcing – demand is projected to grow significantly across all scenarios. This is especially true in the context of escalating geopolitical tensions, where the strategic importance of critical minerals extends beyond the green transition. These minerals are increasingly recognised as essential to national security, given their role in weapons systems, military technologies, and digital infrastructure.
Both Argentina and Chile have responded with aggressive strategies to expand extraction and attract investment, positioning themselves as indispensable players in the global energy transition (Calzada Olvera and Vergara-Fernández 2024; Barberón 2023).
While expanding the mineral sector offers new economic opportunities for foreign exchange, employment, and industrial policy, it also presents profound challenges in terms of governance, social legitimacy, and environmental sustainability (Marín and Goya 2021). In both countries, civil society actors have raised concerns that the green transition may reproduce, rather than address, the social and environmental injustices historically associated with extractive development models (Murguía and Obaya 2024; Dorn and Gundermann 2022; Jerez, Bolados and Torres 2023). Yet their institutional landscapes, political economies, and histories of natural resource governance differ in important ways. These differences are shaping the emergence, visibility, and impact (e.g. whether they result in agreements or escalation) of socioenvironmental conflicts.
2.2 Argentina: federalism, liberalisation, and local resistance
Argentina is not historically a mining country. In 2022, the sector accounted for under 1 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) and 6 per cent of exports, with modest contributions to employment and tax revenues (Marín et al. 2021). Nonetheless, since the 1990s, successive governments have promoted mining as a lever for development and diversification. Key laws – such as the 1993 Mining Investment Law and the 2004 Federal Mining Agreement – established fiscal incentives, tax stability, and protections for foreign investors to integrate Argentina into global extractive value chains.
In parallel, local resistance has gained momentum, shaping the trajectory of projects and influencing both provincial and national policies aimed at expanding mining (Walter 2008; Marín et al. 2021). The 2003 Esquel referendum – where over 80 per cent of voters rejected a proposed gold mine – was a turning point, triggering a cascade of provincial and municipal bans on open‑pit mining and cyanide use. Between 2003 and 2012, more than a dozen provinces adopted such restrictions – including Chubut (Law 5001, 20033), Mendoza (Law 7722, 20074), and Córdoba (2008) – often citing threats to water, contamination risks, and insufficient consultation (Walter and Wagner 2021).
Building on this history, recent efforts by federal and provincial authorities to reverse these bans have consistently faced strong civic pushback. In Mendoza, mass protests in 2019 led to the repeal of reforms to Law 7722 (Página/12 2019) that would have weakened environmental safeguards. In Chubut, large‑scale mobilisation in 2021 forced the reversal of new pro-mining legislation (Marín 2023a). In Jujuy province (2023), a constitutional reform designed to facilitate lithium extraction and limit protest rights sparked widespread opposition (ibid.). Mobilisations – led by indigenous communities such as the Kollas and Atacameños, and supported by unions, teachers, and youth – faced state repression but ultimately prompted a partial revision of the reform.
Resistance is also emerging at earlier stages of the extractive cycle. In Salta, the municipality of Cachi passed ordinances in 2022 and 2023 to block lithium exploration, citing environmental concerns and land and water disputes raised by local populations – even before large-scale operations had begun (Marín 2022).
2.2.1 Regulatory context and impact of resistance
The national mining regime in Argentina is characterised by liberal investment rules and decentralised authority. While the federal government sets environmental baselines and promotes investment, provinces own natural resources, issue permits, and enforce environmental standards (Marín et al. 2021). This division of responsibilities reflects Argentina’s federal structure and has profoundly shaped the evolution of mining governance and resistance.
The decentralised system provides institutional footholds for civic mobilisation. Local and provincial authorities can adopt legal tools to restrict or block extractive activities, empowering communities to influence outcomes. However, this same fragmentation undermines policy coherence, complicates coordination, and limits the enforcement of participatory rights and environmental safeguards at the national level (Marín, Murguía and Itoiz 2024).
2.3 Chile: centralised governance and emerging crisis of legitimacy
Chile has long positioned itself as a mining country par excellence. It is the world’s top copper producer and a major exporter of lithium. Mining accounts for 12 per cent of GDP, 56 per cent of exports, and nearly 20 per cent of fiscal revenues (Vásquez 2021). For decades, the sector enjoyed broad political consensus as a pillar of national development.
This consensus, however, has been eroded. Since the 2000s – and especially after the 2019 social uprisings – mining has become a growing site of contestation (Soto Hernández and Newell 2022; Marín 2022). A series of emblematic conflicts illustrates this shift.
The Dominga project in Coquimbo was halted after more than a decade of legal disputes and public controversy (Laborde 2024; Malinowski 2023; Medina 2023). Civil society groups – fishing communities, environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs), marine biologists, and legal advocates – opposed the project due to its threats to marine ecosystems and protected areas. In 2023, the Council of Ministers rejected the project, citing environmental and procedural concerns amid mounting public pressure.
The Pascua Lama project, a bi-national gold and silver mine led by Barrick Gold, was met with sustained resistance from Diaguita indigenous communities, environmental defenders, and transnational advocacy networks (Dorn and Gundermann 2022; Haslam and Godfrid 2020; Reuters 2013; Jamasmie 2024). Concerns focused on glacier damage, water contamination, and failures in consultation. Years of mobilisation – including protests and legal action – led Chilean courts to suspend and ultimately cancel the project, citing irreversible environmental harm and non-compliance with mitigation requirements. These cases show how multi-scalar resistance – from grass roots to courts and international platforms – can reshape extractive governance (Marín, Palazzo and Morales 2024; Godfrid 2016; Böhling, Murguía and Godfrid 2017).
In the Atacama salt flats, where most of Chile’s lithium reserves are located, indigenous communities – particularly the Lickanantay – have led sustained mobilisation against extractive governance (Catherman 2020; Soto Hernández and Newell 2022). Between 2019 and 2021, the Council of Atacameño Peoples (CPA) filed legal actions against the government economic development agency, Corporación de Fomento de la Producción de Chile (CORFO) for signing contracts with the privately owned Chilean mining company, Sociedad Química y Minera (SQM) and US lithium producer Albemarle without prior consultation. Appeals to environmental tribunals and international forums led to the renegotiation of Albemarle’s agreement and broader scrutiny of Chile’s lithium governance (Dorn and Gundermann 2022; Soto Hernández and Newell 2022).
Tensions escalated in 2023–24 with the rollout of the National Lithium Strategy5 under President Gabriel Boric. The strategy proposed a public–private partnership between state-owned mining company Codelco and SQM in the Salar de Atacama. Although presented as a state-led model, the agreement was strongly criticised by indigenous organisations for bypassing consultation. In early 2024, Lickanantay leaders organised roadblocks and issued public declarations rejecting the deal, demanding co-governance mechanisms. While the government committed to future consultations, indigenous representatives argued that these must precede – not follow – any agreement (IWGIA 2024).
2.3.1 Regulatory context and impact of resistance
Chile’s centralised governance has enabled more cohesive policy reform than Argentina, including the development of ambitious frameworks such as the 2023 Lithium Strategy. However, its top-down approach has provoked a legitimacy crisis (Flores Fernández 2025). Agreements made without prior consultation have triggered direct action – including the 2024 occupation of salt flats – and renewed demands for binding indigenous participation. Repeated failures to reform Chile’s constitution have further exposed societal divisions over how natural resources and rights should be governed.
In this section, based on the review of academic and policy sources and the mapping exercise, I provide a structured overview of the scale, actors, strategies, and outcomes of resistance. I also draw on illustrative cases to highlight how these dynamics shape governance transformations.
3.1 How widespread is resistance?
The mapping shows that resistance is not limited to isolated incidents – it is pervasive and recurrent. Approximately 50 per cent of all large- and medium-scale mining projects in both countries have faced active or latent conflict (Marín 2023b). In Chile, 52 out of 102 projects active in 2022 were involved in some form of confrontation with civil society actors. In Argentina, 9 out of 18 active projects were contested (ibid.; Marín and Cunial 2025).
However, not all regions experience the same intensity of conflict. In Argentina, resistance is particularly concentrated in provinces such as Jujuy and Mendoza, where competition over local resources, strong grass-roots organisations, favourable governance frameworks, environmental movements, and legal mechanisms – such as municipal bans – create fertile ground for contestation. In Chile, regions such as Atacama, where lithium extraction overlaps with indigenous territories and ecologically sensitive areas, are hotbeds of opposition due to strong territorial claims and environmental concerns. These patterns underscore the importance of regional socio-political contexts in shaping the visibility and intensity of conflict.
Importantly, also, in both countries, activism is not confined to extraction zones (Svampa 2019, 2020; Aranda 2013). Movements often connect local struggles to broader national campaigns for environmental and indigenous rights, as seen in mass demonstrations in Buenos Aires and Santiago in response to mining-related reforms.
3.2 Who resists, and why?
Resistance is led by broad and diverse coalitions of actors. These include indigenous communities defending land, water, and cultural rights; territorial assemblies, which are often horizontal and intergenerational in structure; and environmental NGOs, academics, and legal experts who provide technical and legal support. Municipal and local governments also play a key role, particularly in Argentina, where provinces and municipalities have the authority to legislate bans. In addition, religious groups, youth organisations, and trade unions contribute legitimacy, mobilisation capacity, and media visibility to these efforts.
These actors frequently collaborate. In Chubut, indigenous communities (Mapuches and Tehuelches), urban youth, lawyers, and unions coordinated mass protests. In Chile’s Atacama region, alliances between indigenous groups and national advocacy networks have led to legal challenges against major mining companies. The formation of these alliances has often been driven by shared concerns over water rights, territorial autonomy, and the perceived inequities of current governance arrangements. This territorially rooted but at the same time geographically and sectorally interconnected resistance has strengthened its legitimacy and influenced national policy debates (Carmona 2023; Harasim 2020; Soloman 2025).
Importantly, unlike in other world regions – such as sub-Saharan Africa or Southeast Asia – where international NGOs often play a visible and leading role in environmental and human rights advocacy, civil society resistance in Latin America – and particularly in Argentina and Chile – has historically been more grass roots and territorially anchored. Local and regional actors (e.g. indigenous communities, territorial assemblies, local NGOs, and academic institutions) typically lead the charge, drawing on strong traditions of mobilisation and legal activism (Romero‑Toledo 2019; Hadad 2020). While international NGOs may support or amplify these efforts, they generally play a secondary or complementary role. Their contributions have been particularly valuable in helping local actors to engage strategically with transnational arenas – including UN forums, investor networks, and Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) regulatory platforms – by leveraging legal claims, global media outreach, and alliances with diaspora and academic networks to internationalise the struggles.
The drivers of opposition vary, but several common concerns consistently emerge. These include water stress and contamination, especially in lithium extraction zones – an issue present in 31.7 per cent of Chilean cases (Odell 2021); demands for fair benefit sharing, which appear across nearly all cases and often overlap with other grievances (Walter and Wagner 2021); and damage to biodiversity and fragile ecosystems, reported in 24.8 per cent of documented cases (Banerjee, Maher and Krämer 2021). Additionally, opposition is frequently driven by lack of consultation, particularly with Indigenous Peoples (Bustos, Folchi and Fragkou 2017), as well as by the disruption of traditional economic activities and the weakening of social cohesion (Urkidi 2010).
3.3 How is resistance organised?
Social movements deploy a wide and evolving repertoire of strategies that combine legal, institutional, symbolic, and technical tools. These include public protest and media engagement, which appears in 95 per cent of documented cases (Palmisano 2020); civil disobedience, vigils, cultural interventions, and water marches (Möhle 2021; Hadad and Palmisano 2017); and legal actions, such as lawsuits filed against SQM and CORFO in Chile for bypassing indigenous consultation requirements (Romero-Toledo, Videla and Gutiérrez 2017).
Other strategies involve municipal referenda and ordinances – for instance, the 2003 Esquel plebiscite and the ordinances passed in Cachi (Salta) in 2022 and 2023 (Urkidi and Walter 2011); the production of territorially rooted and counter-expert knowledge, such as community-led Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) and alternative development proposals (Cortez and Maillet 2018); and local initiatives challenging contested formal processes, including grass-roots water quality monitoring efforts in Salinas Grandes and Laguna de Guayatayoc (Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros de América Latina 2010).
These strategies often overlap and evolve. In Jujuy, for example, assemblies combined citizen science, international advocacy, and direct action to contest constitutional reforms. Cross‑border learning – especially between provinces in Argentina and between lithium-producing regions in both countries – has further contributed to a sophisticated and expanding repertoire of resistance (Paredes 2018).
As noted earlier, institutional differences between Argentina and Chile help explain variation in the effectiveness of resistance strategies (Haslam and Godfrid 2023). In Chile, where governance is more centralised, the judiciary has become a key arena for contestation. Social movements and indigenous organisations frequently turn to legal challenges and constitutional appeals – particularly through environmental tribunals and the Supreme Court – with favourable outcomes in many cases. In contrast, Argentina’s federal system grants provinces ownership over natural resources and greater autonomy in regulating mining. This decentralisation creates more direct points of leverage for local communities, who can mobilise to influence municipal and provincial authorities. Consequently, tools such as local ordinances, provincial legislation, and participatory mechanisms – such as referenda and environmental councils – play a more prominent role in shaping extractive policy. The relatively higher degree of accountability of subnational policymakers to their constituencies, combined with strong traditions of territorial organising, helps explain the success of provincial bans and bottom-up regulatory innovations in Argentina.
3.4 What is being demanded?
At the heart of many of these strategies lies a struggle over territorial knowledge politics: not just a dispute over land or water, or over who captures the benefits, but over whose visions of development and sustainability are legitimised in public policy, as reflected in demands evolving from initial concerns about risk mitigation and compensation to deeper calls for structural transformation in governance, towards more participative forms and recognition of diverse knowledge(s). Many social movements, though not all, advocate for development models rooted in territorial justice, democratic governance, and environmental sustainability (Urkidi and Walter 2011).
These territorial imaginaries crystallised through two overlapping processes: first, long-running indigenous claims that link water, land, and identity (e.g. the Lickanantay notion of ayllu territory6 in Atacama); and second, the diffusion of anti-extractivist frames – such as ‘Buen Vivir’ (‘Living Well’) and rights-of-nature discourses – through translocal activist networks formed after emblematic victories such as Esquel (2003) and Pascua Lama (2013). Community assemblies, cross-border knowledge exchanges, and court-centred litigation all served as arenas where these narratives were collectively refined and publicly voiced. These dynamics reflect what Temper et al. (2020) call the ‘movement shaping’ of climate futures, where contestation produces forward-looking imaginaries and political agency. The key demands include the following.
3.4.1 The right to say ‘no’ to projects that threaten vital resources, particularly water7
While originally centred on distributive claims, in Atacama, in 2023, the Codelco–SQM lithium partnership was met with roadblocks by indigenous leaders who declared the agreement ‘imposed’ and demanded veto power and co-governance structures. Indigenous communities contested SQM’s lithium operations by organising local water governance and demanding decision-making power over resource use, rejecting extraction plans made without their consent.
3.4.2 Binding and prior participation, not symbolic consultation after decisions are made8
The massive mobilisation in Jujuy in 2023 against constitutional reforms – perceived as enabling lithium expansion without proper consultation – exemplifies the demand for genuine involvement in policy shaping. Public backlash led to partial reversals of the reform. In Caimanes, a town in Chile, residents affected by the El Mauro tailings dam operated by Minera Los Pelambres have demanded prior and binding participation, legal recognition of their rights, and full involvement in environmental decisions, citing threats to their water supply and livelihoods from the project.
3.4.3 Territorial self-determination, including the defence of indigenous governance systems and environmental protections9
In Chubut and Mendoza, community-led mobilisations forced the repeal of legislative reforms that sought to weaken restrictions on toxic mining practices, reinforcing claims to autonomous territorial governance. In Chile’s Huasco Valley, Diaguita communities opposed the Pascua Lama project by Barrick Gold, rejecting it as cultural appropriation and demanding territorial self‑determination to protect their identity, land, and water from becoming a ‘mining valley’.
3.4.4 Recognition of alternative knowledge systems, including ancestral, experiential, and legal understandings of territory and sustainability10
Many movements explicitly reject technocratic framings and assert place-based knowledge as a legitimate foundation for policymaking. In Esquel (Argentina) and Pascua Lama (Chile), anti-mining movements demanded recognition of alternative knowledge systems while creating community-led forums and legal challenges to assert local understandings of sustainability, territory, and justice.
These examples demonstrate that resistance is not merely reactive. Rather, it articulates forward-looking political projects and institutional alternatives that challenge extractivist assumptions and broaden the terms of public debate. As Section 3.5 illustrates, these demands have influenced not only policy discourse but also the institutional frameworks that govern resource extraction and the possibilities of a just transition in Argentina and Chile.
3.5 Effects of resistance: project-level, legal, and institutional outcomes
The analysis of 36 documented cases shows that socioenvironmental conflicts often escalate, persist, and produce concrete effects on policy and practice. Only 18 per cent of conflicts have been reported as addressed or closed – though what constitutes ‘closure’ varies significantly across sources and does not always imply long-term or consensual resolution. Meanwhile, 38 per cent remain active, and 33 per cent are classified as latent. Notably, 30 per cent of the cases resulted in project cancellations – such as the Navidad silver project (Pan American Silver n.d.; Minería & Desarrollo 2022), the Dominga project, and Pascua Lama – while 43 per cent led to delays or suspension of mining operations.
However, the effects of resistance go beyond project stoppages or delays. As shown in the analysis, and in the work of Temper et al. (2020) and Marín and Palazzo (2025), sustained mobilisation has contributed – and has the potential to contribute further – to long-term institutional change.
In Argentina, repeated mobilisation has led to the adoption of provincial laws restricting the use of hazardous substances and technologies, particularly those linked to environmental risks. The 2003 Esquel plebiscite was followed by Law 5001 in Chubut, which prohibits open-pit mining and cyanide use. Inspired by this, several provinces adopted similar legislation: Mendoza’s Law 7722 (2007) bans cyanide, mercury, sulphuric acid, and other toxic substances in metalliferous mining and requires legislative approval for EIAs. La Rioja (2007), Córdoba (2008), San Luis (2010), and Tierra del Fuego (2012) introduced comparable restrictions or moratoria. These laws, often criticised by mining proponents, are seen by civil society as key victories in asserting environmental and territorial rights.
In Chile, ongoing contestation has led to greater scrutiny of environmental governance frameworks. Activism and litigation – particularly from indigenous and environmental groups – have contributed to the strengthening of consultation requirements and environmental evaluation procedures under the Environmental Impact Assessment System (Sistema de Evaluación de Impacto Ambiental, SEIA). Courts have increasingly recognised the necessity of prior consultation under International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 169 (ILO n.d.) and have revoked permits in cases where procedures were inadequate. These shifts reflect how movements have used judicial and administrative tools to push for regulatory innovation and reinterpret existing norms.
Beyond legal resistance, communities have also fostered bottom‑up institutional innovations. In Jujuy (Argentina), indigenous communities in Salinas Grandes and Laguna de Guayatayoc developed their own Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) protocol, titled ‘Kachi Yupi: Huellas de la Sal’ (‘salt footprints’). This protocol outlines culturally grounded procedures for engagement with state and corporate actors, reasserting indigenous authority over territorial governance and offering a norm-setting alternative to extractivist approaches.
Another innovation is the use of participatory environmental monitoring systems, such as the community-led water assessments conducted by indigenous organisations in the same region. These initiatives go beyond protest, institutionalising autonomous systems to track environmental impacts, often based on indigenous knowledge and community priorities. They enhance accountability while asserting territorial control from below.
In Chile, a parallel case is the governance framework proposed by Lickanantay (Atacameño) communities, developed during negotiations with Codelco and SQM. Frustrated by decades of exclusion and concerned about the socio-ecological impacts of lithium extraction, these communities have proposed a co-governance structure that prioritises binding indigenous participation in environmental safeguards, benefit sharing, and water monitoring. By asserting their rights under ILO Convention 169 and offering an alternative to extractive decision-making, these communities are actively reshaping governance norms – proposing mechanisms that reflect territorial values and indigenous world views.
More generally, Marín and Palazzo (2025), in a global mapping of conflict and cooperation events related to mining, found that collaboration and meaningful institutional change can follow from conflict in many situations. Their analysis of over 36,000 conflict events and 63,000 cooperation events worldwide shows that cooperation frequently emerges in the context of sustained resistance. While high levels of polarisation can reduce the chances of constructive engagement, conflict has in many cases served as a catalyst for negotiation, institutional reform, and the development of new participatory governance mechanisms.
These findings underscore the potential of civic resistance not only to block harmful projects but also to enable more democratic and just governance of extractive industries.
State and corporate reactions to socioenvironmental resistance in Argentina and Chile have evolved across a spectrum from repression to reform. Yet most responses remain instrumental, aiming to contain dissent rather than address structural injustices (Haslam and Godfrid 2023; Marín and Cremaschi 2025b; Marín 2025). In the rest of this section, I outline the main patterns – symbolic and compensatory measures and policy reform efforts – and discuss why many responses ultimately fall short.
4.1 Symbolic and compensatory measures
Governments and firms often respond with gestures that aim to contain dissent but leave underlying structural issues unaddressed. Three recurring patterns can be identified. First, companies frequently implement corporate social responsibility (CSR) projects – such as building roads, clinics, or offering short‑term jobs. Minera Alumbrera’s micro-credit and infrastructure schemes in Catamarca are emblematic of this approach, which, while visible, do little to address long‑term environmental damage related to water use and tailings, leading to continued opposition (Böhling et al. 2017; Godfrid 2024). Second, public involvement schemes often occur at late stages, after permits have been granted. A clear example is the 2024 Codelco–SQM roadshows in Atacama, which were purely informational; the Lickanantay communities denounced the process as window-dressing (Marín and Cremaschi 2025b). Third, firms and authorities sometimes resort to selective compensation agreements, making benefit-sharing deals with more compliant actors – such as water-sharing pacts with two Atacameño ayllus – while sidelining dissenting groups and exacerbating local divisions (Devenin 2021; Murguía and Obaya 2024). Such measures rarely rebuild trust in territories marked by long histories of marginalisation and extractive asymmetry (Godfrid 2024).
4.2 Policy reform efforts
There have been mixed attempts to institutionalise more inclusive and sustainable frameworks. In Chile, notable steps include expanding EIAs, ratifying ILO Convention 169 (2008) for indigenous consultation, and ratifying the Escazú Agreement (ECLAC n.d.). The National Lithium Strategy (2023) proposed public–private partnerships, though critics flagged insufficient indigenous consultation in Atacama. Other reforms, including the formalisation of the Consejo de Pueblos Atacameños (CPA) from the early 1990s and the 2013 regulation of consultation processes, indicate gradual shifts towards negotiated resource governance. In Argentina, provinces such as Mendoza – unable to override stringent laws such as Law 7722 on mining chemicals – have adopted participatory governance instead.
These include stakeholder dialogues, standardised environmental assessments, the creation of a public–private development agency (Impulsa Mendoza SA), and a designated mining district in Malargüe intended to concentrate lower-impact mining. While this multi-tiered strategy seeks consensus, tensions remain over environmental safeguards, and its long-term legitimacy is still uncertain. These reforms illustrate the promise and fragility of participatory experimentation under significant political and economic pressure.
4.3 Why many responses fail
Three recurring limitations undermine the effectiveness of these responses. First, participation often occurs at a late stage, with communities brought in only after key decisions have been made – limiting their ability to influence outcomes (Ocampo‑Melgar, Sagaris and Gironás 2019). Second, engagement tends to be selective, involving only compliant actors while excluding dissenting voices, which can deepen internal divisions (Conde and Le Billon 2017; Muñoz Vicuña 2023). Third, decision‑making frameworks frequently marginalise local knowledges, privileging corporate, technical, and legal rationalities over cultural and spiritual values – especially in indigenous territories – thereby reinforcing mistrust (Klein, Muñoz-Torres and Fernández‑Izquierdo 2023).
As Marín and Cremaschi (2025a) argue, these patterns reflect a broader ‘politics of participation’ that prioritises investment legitimacy over transformative justice. This creates a persistent gap between procedural ‘good governance’ and substantive justice, leading many affected communities to contest institutional processes even when formal participatory mechanisms are in place.
The evidence presented in this article reveals that resistance to mining in Argentina and Chile is not merely reactive. It is proactive, organised, and increasingly aimed at reshaping the terms of development. These conflicts call into question not just the environmental and social impacts of extraction but the institutions, technologies, common practices and approaches, assumptions, and power relations that underpin mineral governance.
This section reflects on what the findings suggest for how just transitions and extractive governance might be rethought in ways that are more legitimate, responsive, and sustainable – positioning participatory transformation not as the solution but rather as a terrain of ongoing contestation and possibility.
5.1 What resistance reveals
First, resistance consistently reveals a crisis of legitimacy in extractive governance. In both countries, projects are often perceived as imposed, regardless of their formal legality or compliance with regulations. This perception stems from several factors: the timing and structure of participation, which is typically late stage and non-binding; the disregard for local knowledge, values, and priorities, particularly among indigenous and rural communities; and a broader disconnect between national strategies and territorial governance.
Second, resistance makes visible alternative territorial imaginaries – development visions grounded in care for ecosystems, autonomy, and intergenerational rights. While these imaginaries do not always translate into institutional proposals, they challenge the idea that extractivism is the only or inevitable path to progress. As traced in Section 3.4, these visions emerged from indigenous epistemologies and translocal activist learning, suggesting that resistance is also a laboratory for new socio‑ecological imaginaries.
Third, resistance can function as a form of informal institutional innovation. As shown in cases such as Esquel, Alumbrera, or Atacama, civil society actors have created new mechanisms of environmental monitoring, local legislation, and translocal coordination. These practices often outpace formal institutions in their responsiveness, adaptability, and legitimacy. Importantly, however, these newer practices and claims – emphasising procedural justice, recognition, and territorial autonomy – do not replace the long-standing demands for better distribution of economic benefits. Rather, they build on and expand them. Calls for environmental protection, indigenous rights, and democratic participation are frequently articulated alongside demands for local employment, investment in public services, and fairer sharing of extractive revenues. What emerges is a more multidimensional contestation of extractive governance that combines distributive, procedural, and recognition-based claims.
5.2 Limited transformations, enduring tensions
Despite these openings, examples of transformative governance remain rare and fragile. Most responses to conflict continue to rely on symbolic inclusion or transactional solutions. Even in cases where participation is institutionalised, power asymmetries – between companies, states, and communities – remain difficult to overcome, while transformational outcomes are not pursued.
Furthermore, some conflicts result in institutional backlash rather than reform. In Jujuy and Mendoza, popular mobilisation temporarily reversed reforms, but state actors quickly sought new ways to restore investment conditions. This cycle of mobilisation and rollback reflects the structural tension between short-term resource exploitation and longer-term democratic governance.
Nonetheless, these tensions have produced critical spaces for contestation and learning. Drawing on recent work (Marín and Cremaschi 2025a), I suggest that even if a fully ‘transformative’ model remains out of reach, conflict can serve as a laboratory of governance, where new ideas, alliances, and mechanisms are tested and refined.
5.3 Towards more democratic governance?
Key principles derived from the conflicts in Argentina and Chile highlight the need for more inclusive and responsive governance. Participation must be early, broad (involving not only formal stakeholders but also those often seen as peripheral to decision-making – such as indigenous organisations, territorial assemblies, and local community actors), and binding, in order to rebuild trust and avoid polarisation. Territorial visions and knowledge systems must be taken seriously, rather than being filtered out through technocratic procedures. Furthermore, the recognition of diversity – whether legal, environmental, or consultative – must be transparent and genuinely responsive to the variety of community actors involved, not just their formal representatives.
These are not proposals for ideal models, but reflections grounded in empirical evidence. As the energy transition accelerates, the legitimacy of mining – and its ability to contribute to sustainable development – will depend not only on technologies or market access, but on the capacity to build inclusive, adaptive institutions that engage with the demands emerging from below.
This article has shown that socioenvironmental resistance to mining in Argentina and Chile is not merely an obstacle to be managed, but a dynamic force reshaping the institutional and political landscape of extractive governance. Far from being uniform or reactive, these movements are territorially grounded, diverse in their strategies, and increasingly connected to broader debates over justice, participation, and transformation. Their actions have produced tangible outcomes – from project suspensions and legal reforms to the creation of innovative, bottom-up governance practices.
Yet, despite important advances, many tensions remain unresolved. Transformative change has been partial and uneven, constrained by institutional inertia, entrenched power asymmetries, and economic imperatives. Future research should seek to understand when resistance fosters democratic innovation rather than polarisation, why certain strategies prove more effective in specific contexts, and the long-term sustainability of institutional reforms initiated from below.
It should also seek to understand better why some mining projects do not generate visible contention – or even receive support from segments of civil society. Although the evidence is limited in this regard, existing research suggests that factors such as local dependence on mining for employment or services, trust in institutions, the presence of CSR initiatives and the absence of perceived environmental threats can reduce the likelihood of mobilisation (Conde and Le Billon 2017). In Chile, Akchurin (2020) similarly finds that opposition is more likely in agrarian or indigenous communities where projects pose clear risks to land and water use. These findings point to the need for further research on the conditions under which communities accept, tolerate, or even endorse extractive projects – as well as on forms of civil society engagement that fall outside the register of resistance.
A central task is to move from case-level analysis to frameworks that capture systemic transformation. This requires cross-country comparisons and transnational research to assess whether the patterns observed in Argentina and Chile – where bottom-up mobilisation has spurred governance innovation – are mirrored elsewhere. As shown in Marín and Palazzo (2025), mapping and characterising conflicts at a global scale reveals both converging dynamics and significant regional differences.
Further work is also needed to explore how companies are affected by civic resistance. What types of firms are more likely to be involved in conflict? Do these tensions influence investment decisions or trigger technological changes? Are companies adapting, resisting, or reshaping their strategies in response to social contestation? Answering these questions demands rethinking the notion of civic power and examining the institutional mechanisms through which it may reconfigure extractive systems at scale. It also requires building interdisciplinary frameworks that connect grounded struggles with system-level change, while centring perspectives from the global South.
As the energy transition accelerates, the ability of states and companies to respond to territorial demands – not only through consultation, but through co-governance and accountability – will be critical in determining whether mineral extraction remains a site of social conflict or becomes a pathway towards more democratic and sustainable development. Understanding and supporting the civic infrastructures that make these alternatives possible is no longer only a normative imperative – it is increasingly a condition for the legitimacy and viability of the green transition itself.
Notes
1 This issue of the IDS Bulletin was supported in part by a Ford Foundation grant entitled ‘Learning at the Intersections of Just Transitions: Spaces for Engagement, Voices from the Margins and Cross-Sectoral Alliances in Resource-Rich Countries of the Global South’. The British Academy also provided earlier support for the project ‘Making Space for Dialogue on Just Transitions in Africa’s Oil and Gas Producing Regions’ (2022) which helped to lay the foundation for much of this work. The opinions expressed are the authors’ own and do not reflect the views of the funders.
2 Anabel Marín, Research Fellow, Institute of Development Studies, UK and Conicet, Argentina.
3 See Law 5001 of Chubut.
4 See Law 7722 of Mendoza.
5 See National Lithium Strategy, Government of Chile.
6 The ayllu is a traditional Andean form of collective organisation that combines kinship, territory, and communal governance. Ayllu territories are managed collectively and reflect deep spiritual and ecological ties between indigenous communities and their land. They play a central role in indigenous identity and have been key sites of resistance to extractive activities that threaten both livelihoods and cultural continuity.
7 See Lunde Seefeldt (2022).
8 See Oh, Shin and Ho (2023).
9 See Banerjee et al. (2021).
10 See Urkidi and Walter (2011).
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© 2025 The Author. IDS Bulletin © Institute of Development Studies | DOI: 10.19088/1968-2025.140 This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence (CC BY), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original authors and source are credited and any modifications or adaptations are indicated.
The IDS Bulletin is published by Institute of Development Studies, Library Road, Brighton, BN1 9RE, UK. This article is part of IDS Bulletin Vol. 56 No. 2 November 2025 ‘Struggles for Justice in the Energy Transition: Voices from the Front Lines’; the Introduction is also recommended reading.