Hamid Khalafallah,1 Oluwole Ojewale2 and Marjoke Oosterom3
This article advances understandings of how social media was used both as a space and as a catalyst of political mobilisation by youth-led movements in Africa to advance their democratic demands. It examines youth-led movements in three countries: the Sudan protests from 2018 to 2019, the #EndSARS protests in Nigeria in 2020, and the #FreeSenegal protests spanning 2021 to 2024. These movements highlighted significant concerns regarding governance, economic disparity, human rights, and democracy. While African youth continue to be sidelined from formal politics, their online protests and street protests did not just counter autocratic tendencies by the state but also reflected their political imaginaries. Their political expressions indicate adherence to democratic tenets such as participation and accountability.
Political mobilisation, youth, political imaginary, social media, state repression, Africa, Senegal, Nigeria, Sudan.
African youth between the ages of 18 to 35 do not differ much from their elders in terms of support for democracy, but they are less satisfied with what democracy has done for them (Afrobarometer 2024). Satisfaction with democracy has dropped even in some of the ‘high profile’ democracies (ibid.). What are young people’s political imaginaries?
Debates on young people often portray youth as either ‘apathetic’ and disengaged from politics, or as ‘troublemakers’ who seek change through violence and protest, as if they lack the ability for political judgement or political imaginary altogether (Bessant 2020). Yet many have pointed out how young people engage in informal politics creatively, and much of this engagement occurs in everyday ways rather than through activism and protest (Honwana 2012). These political practices can reflect youth political imaginaries. For instance, the mobilisation strategies of Egyptian youth in the 2011 uprisings were not just ‘tactics’ but embodied the promise of new ways of practising politics after dictatorship, striving for social justice and long-term goals (El-Sharnouby 2017). Youth often turn to voluntary work and alternative political networks in response to repression and disillusionment with traditional parties, indicating that they are not apathetic about politics; instead, they are marginalised by conventional political systems (Van Gyampo and Anyidoho 2019).
The networks that emerge among youth and the urban poor may fulfil a practical need but can be mobilised to advance political change (Branch and Mampilly 2015). Diehl (2019) has argued that factual contradictions, such as for instance democratic deficits, do not invalidate the horizon of meaning that the political imaginary constitutes. Imaginaries thus blend reality and normative ideals and, considering the diversity among young people, it is not surprising that there is also a heterogeneity of political imaginaries, sometimes even within movements (Ferreira da Silva, Carvalho and Fernandes-Jesus 2024).
Recent years have witnessed protests with a prominent role for young people in several African countries. This article examines the dynamics of mobilisation, in particular the role of social media, and what political imaginaries these protests represent. It is structured as follows. Section 2 addresses the role of social media in political mobilisation. Sections 3, 4, and 5 present the three case studies discussed in the article, Nigeria, Senegal and Sudan. Section 6 considers the motivation for youth political mobilisation and why protests happened in the cases discussed in the article. Section 7 examines the nature of youth mobilisation in the discussed countries, and which social media was used in particular. Section 8 discusses how the state responded to youth political mobilisation in the discussed cases. Section 9 provides some concluding remarks.
The demographic changes linked to the shift from traditional to advanced economies underpin many current theories concerning the formation of both violent and non-violent protests. Evidence suggests that levels of urbanisation and the extent of the youth population are effective metrics for anticipating protest events in various countries. Since these developments are outcomes of modernisation, it is logical to assert that the combined influence of increasing urbanisation and a burgeoning youth population, termed the ‘urban youth bulge’, would provide a significant predictor of protest occurrences (Sawyer et al. 2021).
The emergence of digital technology and the spread of social media have significantly transformed political mobilisation in Africa and altered the dynamics of urban protests. They have provided new avenues for African youth to mobilise, organise, and increase political consciousness and engagement (Kalyango and Adu-Kumi 2013; Mukhongo 2015), as well as facilitating decentralised organisation and swift dissemination of information beyond urban spaces. Social media platforms have facilitated rapid and effective organisation of protest movements, increased voter turnout, enhanced election monitoring, and amplified marginalised voices in political discourse (Ajaegbu and Ajaegbu 2024; Cariolle et al. 2024). They have also allowed youth movements to coordinate efforts and share their messages on a global scale, thereby transforming local issues into regional and global concerns. Since the Arab uprisings in 2011, Africa has witnessed a wave of protest largely driven by a youthful population. This includes movements such as #FreeSenegal, #TasgutBas,4 and #EndSARS. These expressions have reverberated beyond the shores of the continent.
However, the influence of social media on African politics is complex. While it has fostered greater civic participation, it has also contributed to the spread of misinformation and disinformation, potentially fuelling distrust in democratic institutions (Ajaegbu and Ajaegbu 2024; Tsuwa and Akase 2024). Phenomena such as ‘slacktivism’ or ‘clicktivism’, as forms of low-effort digital activism, oversimplify complex issues and lead to a false sense of accomplishment without tangible results (Otiono 2021). Furthermore, some governments have responded to the empowering effects of social media by implementing restrictive measures such as internet shutdowns, highlighting the tension between digital political mobilisation and state control (Aboagye, Kipgen and Nwuche 2020; Ajaegbu and Ajaegbu 2024; Lemaire 2023). Despite these challenges, and as the digital political landscape continues to evolve, social media remains a powerful tool for youth political mobilisation in Africa. It has also contributed to changing the narrative about African youth from being perceived as politically passive, to being more politically conscious and engaged.
Nigeria’s political history is woven with rich experiences of youth protests. Indeed, Nigeria’s independence movement was birthed and sustained by youth. Foremost among youth coalitions is the Nigeria Youth Movement (NYM), founded in 1934 (Nolte 2023; Sofowora n.d.). NYM was the first Nigerian, nationalist organisation, favoured by the educated elite and opposed to indirect British rule (Awolowo 1960). Despite the initial progress of postcolonial democratisation, the first military coup in 1966 interrupted this trajectory, bringing young leaders in their twenties and thirties to the forefront of governance (BBC 2016). Democracy would not be re-established until 1979.
Beyond 1966, the quest for democratisation gave birth to student-led activism. With the establishment of first-generation universities and colleges, students organised themselves under the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS), and operated as a pressure group, consistently advocating for changes in government policies, while also fighting against injustices (Abe and Adedokun 2023).
In October 2020, widespread protests emerged across Nigeria under the banner of #EndSARS, advocating for the complete disbandment of the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) within the Nigerian Police Force (Abuh et al. 2020). Established in the mid-1990s to address armed robbery, SARS was notorious for the harassment of innocent individuals, extortion, and extrajudicial killings. Most of the demonstrators were young Nigerians. Initially, the protests lacked a centralised leadership, with demands focused on the federal government abolishing SARS, delivering justice to victims of police violence, and reforming the police force (Ojewale 2020). The demands expanded to address the government’s failure to provide equitable economic opportunities, particularly affecting the youth. The protesters also called for law enforcement to uphold the rule of law, and greater respect for human rights. Additionally, they sought improvements in the educational and health-care systems, as well as increased job creation. The non-partisan character of the protests contributed to the broad public support and the achievements they garnered (ibid.).
Senegal has historically been regarded as the epitome of electoral democracy in West Africa, exemplifying a consistent transfer of power without the interruption of military coups (Osori 2024). The country has gained global attention in recent years due to the authoritarian actions of Macky Sall (president from 2012 to 2024), which resulted in notable unrests. However, this is not the first time a president in Senegal has imposed restrictions on civil liberties or limited electoral participation. Léopold Sédar Senghor, the first president of Senegal (term of office, 1960–80) effectively established a one-party state under his Senegalese Progressive Union (UPS) party, preventing other political parties from contesting elections until 1976 (Kanté 1994). Successive administrations, from Senghor to Sall, have attempted to suppress dissent and undermine democracy.
In 1981, Senghor was succeeded by his prime minister, Abdou Diouf (term of office, 1981–2000), who upheld the tradition of authoritarianism by suppressing opposition to consolidate political power. The pursuit of a fourth term by Diouf in the 2000 presidential election incited a significant grass-roots movement, predominantly led by young individuals and musicians, referred to as Bul faale, meaning ‘Don’t worry’ (Dieng 2016). Abdoulaye Wade’s victory in the 2000 election was greatly enhanced by the support of the youth movement. Nevertheless, from 2011 to 2012 Wade’s government sought to consolidate power amid rising public opposition, including a dynamic youth movement that united against him, spearheaded by prominent musicians under the slogan Y’en a marre (‘We’re fed up’), who protested Wade’s efforts to obtain a third term (Quist-Arcton 2012).
Under the leadership of Macky Sall, the country adopted authoritarian characteristics across at least three critical dimensions. First, the government engaged in the relentless targeting of opposition parties and their representatives, the deployment of the police force to quell public protests, and the strategic use of lawfare to undermine opposition voices. Second, there were notable restrictions on protests, media censorship, arrests and intimidation of journalists, digital repression, and attempts to alter the constitution to secure an undue electoral advantage for the incumbent party’s candidate, thereby reinforcing their grip on power (Kelly 2024). Prominent opposition leaders, notably Ousmane Sonko, were detained, an action widely understood as an effort aimed at eradicating political rivals. The measures taken by Sall against opposition members reflect a wider trend of repression that has sparked considerable apprehension regarding the health of democracy in Senegal, and the country was downgraded on several democracy indices (CIVICUS 2023; Freedom House 2024). When Sall postponed the 2024 elections, mass protests erupted that would eventually stem his autocratic turn.
From December 2018, millions of Sudanese people took to the streets as part of a nationwide popular uprising that toppled the regime and instigated a political transition in September 2019, with hopes that these monumental events would establish democratic governance. Yet the transition was fragile, and the risk of failure was high (Sørbø 2020; Elhag 2020). Two years later, Sudan’s political transition was impeded when the military launched a coup in October 2021. Furthermore, the country is now facing more fundamental challenges following the outbreak of war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in April 2023.
Sudan’s 2019 political transition was primarily led by grass-roots movements, in collaboration with civil society and political parties (El-Battahani 2021; Bishai 2023). The main pro-democracy grass-roots movement in the 2019 transition was the Resistance Committees (RCs), thousands of coordinated movement groups that emerged in neighbourhoods across the country and became the most influential actors in Sudan’s political spheres (El-Battahani 2021). Membership of the RCs is mostly young people, yet it transcends ethnicity, class, and other social divides (El-Battahani 2021; Bishai 2023).
The RCs have taken on characteristics that are novel in the Sudanese context, but they have also adopted and developed some of the patterns of other movements in the region, particularly in terms of protests and mobilisation techniques, and the use of social media (Bishai 2023). Remarkably, the RCs sustained their activism and mobilisation beyond the revolution and the political transition, and continued to play significant roles following the coup and after the outbreak of war (Abbashar 2023). They have also adapted the roles they play to the changing context, by mobilising citizens and developing political visions, as well as providing humanitarian assistance to citizens in times of crisis (El-Battahani 2021). Despite the change in their roles and activities, the RCs continue to emphasise the need for a participatory democratic form of governance (Abbashar 2023).
Indeed, the RCs have faced various difficulties and shortcomings that have limited their impact and ability to actualise their democratic aspirations (ibid.). Yet, regardless of the outcomes, testimonies documented by journalists have shown how the RCs have changed the nature of the relationship between the state and citizens in Sudan (Bishai 2023; Gussai et al. 2022), by exhibiting how resistance can become a way of life and a way of performing democratic rights in a bottom-up manner.
Despite the current setback in Sudan’s democratic transition, some scholars have argued that the ongoing Sudanese conflict should be understood and analysed as a counter-revolutionary war, aimed at impeding the democratic aspirations of the country’s youth and eliminating the new modalities they invented for political mobilisation (Abbas et al. 2024). To that end, the mobilisation of youth movements in Sudan, particularly through social media, has resulted in long-term impacts on Sudanese society, despite the current harrowing war.
The motivation for youth-led protests and mobilisation in Nigeria, Senegal, and Sudan is fundamentally rooted in a collective disillusionment with systemic governance failures, economic marginalisation, and inadequate political representation. These protests signify a shared demand for accountable leadership, equitable opportunities, and meaningful participation in governance and decision-making. In other words, their protests are not just about resistance but reflect a democratic imaginary.
Dissatisfaction among the youth had deepened before the #EndSARS protest in Nigeria, fuelled by an economic crisis due to the global demand for oil decreasing, which was further exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic. Additionally, widespread corruption pushed more Nigerians into poverty. This unrest was intensified by an eight-month closure of educational institutions due to strikes by university lecturers, which frustrated large numbers of youth (Adeniran 2020). The unemployment rate in Nigeria reached an alarming 27.1 per cent by the second quarter of 2020, while an additional 28.6 per cent of the population was classified as under-employed (Ojewale 2020). The government further exacerbated the situation by announcing increases in fuel prices and electricity tariffs (ibid.).
Frustrations have escalated in Senegal in recent years due to several factors, including high levels of youth unemployment and claims of systemic corruption (Hammerschlag 2023). Successive administrations have struggled to effectively tackle youth unemployment, which has emerged as a critical issue for the country’s rapidly growing population, more than 60 per cent of whom are under the age of 25. In 2019, 35 per cent of young Senegalese were reported to be neither employed nor engaged in education or training. The economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic further tightened the job market. By 2023, nearly three-quarters of Senegalese Afrobarometer’s survey respondents believed the government was mismanaging the economy (Afrobarometer 2024). Additionally, the percentage of individuals who viewed the economic situation as poor rose from 33 per cent in 2017 to 62 per cent in 2022 (Reuters 2024).
The mobilisation against Omar al-Bashir’s regime (term of office, 1989–2019) between 2018 and 2019 in Sudan was largely driven by a generation that had grown up under oppressive governance structures, which had stifled political participation and economic opportunities. The pervasive issues of corruption, lack of transparency, and ineffective institutions have led to widespread public discontent among the youth. Youth who took to the streets in December 2018 were initially chanting anti-austerity slogans after the price of bread tripled, associating economic hardship with the corruption of al-Bashir’s regime (Malik 2022). The regime in Sudan, which lasted for nearly three decades, had implemented a series of repressive measures and systemic human rights violations aimed at consolidating power and suppressing dissent (IMF 2020). It’s focus on clientelism and patronage networks further alienated large segments of the population, exacerbating socioeconomic inequalities and fuelling grievances that culminated in mass protests (Aalen 2020; Hassan and Kadouda 2019). These dynamics highlight how bad governance not only undermines public trust but also galvanises collective action among young people seeking democratic reform.
The protests led by youth in Nigeria, Senegal, and Sudan, inspired by shared experiences of governance failures, economic disenfranchisement, and democratic backsliding, highlight a compelling democratic vision that extends beyond mere dissatisfaction. These movements convey a demand for responsible leadership, equitable access to opportunities, and true participation, indicating a call for a comprehensive reformation of the political environment. Whether through the #EndSARS movement’s push for police reform and the eradication of corruption in Nigeria, the protests against unemployment and perceived corruption in Senegal, or the anti-austerity and anti-regime efforts that resulted in the removal of al-Bashir in Sudan, these actions emphasise a collective desire for democratic governance that prioritises the wellbeing of citizens and encourages inclusive political and economic systems. This developing democratic vision, rooted in a rejection of the current state of affairs, serves as a significant impetus for youth mobilisation and a potential driver of political transformation across the region.
Social media has been crucial in providing an avenue for online activism in all three countries, and critical to collective action and scaling protests.
In Nigeria, growing youth engagement on social media and the democratisation of information provided the needed momentum for the online and offline protests. Protesters delivered strong statements to the government using actual protests and social media protests simultaneously. #EndSARS gained traction through platforms such as Twitter (now X) and Instagram, where individuals shared their personal accounts of mistreatment, videos of incidents, and calls for justice. Platforms were also used to raise funds for legal and medical assistance, and provided real-time updates on the situation. The political activism was engendered by fostering strong ties and relationships on social media with netizens from different spaces (Abimbade, Olayoku and Herro 2022). The #EndSARS protest led to the disbandment of the SARS in October 2020.
Despite doubts regarding the sincerity of this action, it marked a significant moment. The movement spurred a political awakening among Nigerian youth, many of whom later engaged in elections and civic reform efforts. Global support for the campaign led to judicial panels that investigated police abuses and amplified demands for accountability. The #EndSARS protest translated to a political cause popularly known as the Obidient movement. The movement is a grass-roots political and social force that emerged in 2022 to rally support for Peter Obi, the Labour Party’s presidential candidate in the 2023 elections. Fuelled by young Nigerians, civil society activists, and disillusioned individuals, it aimed to confront the established power of the All Progressives Congress (APC) and the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP).
Recognised for its vigorous digital activism and volunteer enthusiasm, the movement epitomised a youth-driven political resurgence that crossed ethnic and religious divides. It is often regarded as the political continuation of the #EndSARS movement, redirecting the protest energy from 2020 into electoral engagement. Many individuals who participated in the #EndSARS protests found their political voice for the first time through the Obidient movement, viewing Obi as a beacon of hope for a transformed Nigeria. Indeed, the youth held a lot of electoral sway in the 2023 election, propelling Obi to third place5 – a rare feat in the annals of the nation’s history (Tayo 2023).
In Senegal, pre-existing discontent over corruption and the economy culminated when President Sall postponed national elections, and a controversial court decision extended his term. The youth movement leveraged platforms such as Facebook (now Meta), WhatsApp, and Twitter to organise protests, disseminate information, and rally support. Hashtags such as #SenegalRevolt and #FreeSenegal emerged as unifying slogans for demonstrators, allowing them to coordinate decentralised actions throughout the nation and garner international backing. These examples demonstrate how social media transcends borders, empowers citizen journalism, and facilitates the swift spread of information. A significant turning point for the #FreeSenegal movement occurred when the ruling party tried to manipulate the electoral process in 2024.
Demonstrations gained traction through social media and grass-roots mobilisation, attracting substantial crowds nationwide. The government’s efforts to restrict digital freedom and suppress dissent prompted a strong response from the Senegalese diaspora in Europe and the United States, which used digital technologies and international networks to challenge political repression. Using diverse social media platforms, diaspora members raised global awareness and disseminated information about human rights abuses in Senegal and urged their governments to take appropriate action. The wave of protests ultimately resulted in Sall’s relinquishing his ambition for a third presidential term. Furthermore, the constitutional court overturned a decree made by the president that postponed indefinitely the election slated for February 2024 and instead compelled the government to conduct it (Maclean 2024). The eventual election of opposition candidate Bassirou Diomaye Faye in 2024 (term of office, 2024–present) represented a generational change and a reaffirmation of democratic values. This period also saw the release of significant opposition figures and a surge in political awareness among the youth.
Dissatisfied with traditional political institutions, Sudanese youth turned to grass-roots movements and social media platforms to organise protests and express their demands for change (Aalen 2020; Malik 2022). The RCs played a crucial role in organising localised opposition to al-Bashir’s government (Bishai 2023), utilising both online and offline strategies to bypass traditional political hierarchies and coordinate decentralised protest movements. They redefined political engagement through innovative uses of social media, transforming digital platforms into critical tools for organising protests, disseminating information, and sustaining momentum. By leveraging platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp, activists circumvented state censorship, documented human rights abuses, facilitated real-time communication, and forged transnational solidarity networks (Durie 2019; UNDP 2020).
The Sudanese Professionals’ Association (SPA), a coalition of trade unions and a key player in the protests, utilised social media platforms to coordinate actions with RCs and other opposition groups. Weekly hashtags such as #TasgutBas (JustFall), #SudanUprising, and #BlueForSudan were strategically employed to draw international attention to their plight and to unify protesters across the country and in the diaspora. This online mobilisation helped in disseminating information among larger populations across the country, as well as mobilising funding from the diaspora for the protests. More importantly, online activism by the RCs and other groups was a space for political discourse in itself to create awareness around their demands, engage in political debates, and discuss options for the future of Sudan (UNDP 2020; Malik 2022).
The RCs, in particular, used online means to develop political charters in a participatory manner, engaging youth from all parts of the country (Bishai 2023). A key characteristic of the political charters they developed was rejecting the centralised state inherited from colonial rule, and articulating visions for decentralised bottom-up structures, as a reflection of their democratic imaginary. The political mobilisation of the Sudanese youth led to the overthrow of the 30-year-old authoritarian regime of al-Bashir. It also undeniably reshaped Sudan’s political landscape by introducing new forms of grass-roots activism and challenging the dominance of Sudanese elites (Bishai 2023).
The interplay between online and offline activism has been crucial in shaping the dynamics of youth-led movements in Nigeria, Senegal, and Sudan. While social media provided a space for mobilisation, it was often complemented by door-to-door outreach, community meetings, and street protests. This hybrid approach was particularly evident during the mass protests in Sudan on 30 June 2019, which saw millions taking to the streets, despite state efforts to disrupt communication channels (El-Battahani 2022), and in Place de la Nation in central Dakar, Senegal, in 2024 (France 24 2024), and at Lekki Toll Gate in Lagos, Nigeria, by #EndSARS protesters in 2020 (Human Rights Watch 2021).
The scale and achievements of youth movements notwithstanding, those involved in them have faced fierce and violent state responses, which underscores how processes of autocratisation involve the interplay between autocratisation and resistance.
The Government of Nigeria employed a range of forceful tactics and targeted crackdowns to suppress the #EndSARS protests. Security forces, including the Nigerian Army, were mobilised to disperse peaceful gatherings, leading to a widely condemned incident at the Lekki Toll Gate on 20 October 2020 where soldiers shot at unarmed protesters, resulting in numerous casualties. Furthermore, the authorities intensified their efforts to stifle dissent by freezing the bank accounts of protest leaders, intimidating activists through arrests, and imposing curfews to prevent mass assemblies. Online activism faced significant restrictions as well, with increased surveillance and reported attempts by the government to disrupt digital platforms used by the protesters. These actions reflect the state’s reluctance to address systemic grievances (Human Rights Watch 2021).
In Senegal, the government employed digital repression to suppress online activism and demonstrations, including through internet shutdowns such as in the early hours of 5 March 2021, coinciding with protests against the arrest of Ousmane Sonko. On 2 August 2021, authorities suspended access to the social video platform TikTok, asserting that it was being utilised to disseminate hateful and subversive content that jeopardised the nation’s stability. The deployment of police forces during protests and opposition gatherings resulted in frequent confrontations. These incidents occasionally escalated into violence, with claims of excessive force being utilised against demonstrators and opposition leaders. This culminated in 685 incidents of political protest and riots, with 65 deaths (CIVICUS and Digital Democracy Initiative 2024). The government imposed limitations on public gatherings, often citing security as the rationale. However, the restrictions were aimed at suppressing dissent and obstructing the opposition’s ability to mobilise support.
While social media allowed Sudanese youth to amplify their collective voice and transcend geographical boundaries, the regime regularly shut down internet services to impede the effectiveness of online mobilisation (UNDP 2020; Human Rights Watch 2021). Moreover, Omar al-Bashir’s regime employed extreme violence to suppress protests, including the detention of thousands of activists and the deployment of security forces armed with live ammunition, rubber bullets, and tear gas (Amnesty International 2019). Simultaneously, a series of repressive measures and superficial reforms aimed to quell public dissent by addressing the immediate economic grievances of the population. President al-Bashir declared a state of emergency in February 2019, which included dissolving national and regional governments, and pledged to maintain subsidies for essential goods such as flour and fuel, which had been a major point of contention among protesters (Assal 2019; Kuol 2019). Also, in a symbolic gesture to placate the demonstrators, in March 2019 al-Bashir ordered the release of women arrested during protests against the government. The regime’s strategy also included a systematic attempt to delegitimise the protests by framing them as violent riots orchestrated by ‘foreign agents’ or ‘looters’, thereby justifying its use of force (Malik 2022).
These developments highlight the ongoing conflict between state control over digital infrastructure and civil society resistance. Nevertheless, states’ hostilities have failed to crush youth movements and eliminate their political mobilisation. Youth movements manage to alternate between online and offline tools, depending on the context, to remain active and to manoeuvre the state’s response.
The persistent trend of youth-led mobilisation in Nigeria, Senegal, and Sudan highlights the significant role that poor governance plays as a catalyst for democratic resistance, thereby altering the dynamics between governments and their citizens. Social media has become a pivotal medium in fostering youth political mobilisation, providing alternative spaces for dialogue and action. The accessibility of social media has empowered youth to bypass traditional gatekeepers of political discourse and to challenge conventional politics. However, youth online political mobilisation has triggered autocratic tendencies by states. The consequent heightened state repression and unstable political transitions underscore the complexities of such endeavours. Yet the political mobilisation of youth movements in Nigeria, Senegal, and Sudan has had remarkable achievements. In the contexts studied, social media serves as both an avenue for online political engagement and a catalyst for offline activism. The interplay between online engagement and offline activism underscores the transformative potential of social media in reshaping Africa’s political landscape through the lens of its most vibrant demographic – its youth.
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