Mark Robinson1
Democracy in Africa has experienced a turbulent trajectory over the past three decades. Activists celebrated a wave of transitions to multi-party democracy and the end of military rule across much of the continent in the 1990s. This gained fresh momentum with the Arab Spring in the early 2010s when popular protests ejected authoritarian rulers across much of North Africa. But this wave of democratic transitions has not been sustained. A return to authoritarian rule over the past decade has curbed the optimism of democracy activists and external actors. Civic space is increasingly constrained in many countries, including those which continue to hold elections. Governance reforms have faltered as democracy has stalled. Violent conflict has resurfaced in the Horn of Africa, along with jihadist insurgencies in the Sahel. This article considers how far civil society can play a constitutive role in sustaining democratic institutions and preserving civic space in the face of enduring threats to democracy and governance in Africa.
Africa, civil society, democracy, governance, foreign aid.
There were high hopes for civil society in Africa in the early 1990s. A wave of transitions to multi-party democracy was underway on the continent. Civil society organisations (CSOs) were making a significant contribution to the building of democratic institutions following years of authoritarian rule. Expectations abounded around the contribution that civil society could make to embedding democratic values, broadening associational activity, and fostering good governance (Bratton 1989; Harbeson, Rothchild and Chazan 1994; Robinson 1995; Lewis 1998).
Many CSOs played vital roles in service delivery, building on long traditions of education and health provision established by churches and religious bodies from colonial times and after independence. African media blossomed as censorship declined and new technologies offered innovative tools for communications and influence. The Arab Spring witnessed a series of anti-government protests and rebellions across the Arab world and North Africa (Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt) in the early 2010s, in which civil society played a constitutive role and helped lay the foundations for a transition from authoritarian rule (Sater 2013).
At this juncture, clarity on the nature of civil society and its expected contribution to democratic consolidation is warranted, bearing in mind Diamond’s definition of consolidation as the widespread acceptance of democracy as the preferred system for the conduct of political affairs (Diamond 1994). White’s seminal article summarised the contribution of civil society to democratic governance in four complementary ways: by altering the balance of power between state and society to achieve a balanced opposition in favour of the latter; enforcing standards of public morality and performance, and improving the accountability of politicians and state officials; transmitting the demands and articulating the interests of organised groups, in the process providing an alternative sphere of representation; and instilling and upholding democratic values (White 1995).
In short, civil society is often thought to contribute to democratic consolidation by strengthening the freedoms of association and expression, representing organised interests outside the political sphere, promoting democratic values, and holding officials to account.
Most definitions treat civil society as an organisational realm outside the private sphere and the state, populated by independent organisations representing citizens exercising collective interests in the pursuit of shared goals and values. These tend to equate civil society with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with legal recognition and do not necessarily reflect the full reality of associational life outside the state (Edwards 2019). Ndegwa (1996), for example, draws attention to the importance of citizen movements representing societal groups that lack formal organisational capacity, not all of which have the pursuit of democracy as their prime objective.
Obadare (2011) is critical of interpretations that reduce civil society to voluntary organisations that play an intermediary role between society and the state, arguing that this does not reveal the full complexity of civil society in the African context.2 Such organisations garner the majority of funding and arguably adopt more cautious approaches to avoid the risk of retribution. Others have emphasised the importance of channels for articulating citizen voice and engagement that may not cohere into the formal realm of civil society, but nevertheless expand opportunities for participation and representation at the community level (Gaventa and Barrett 2012).
Turning to the broader political context, from a select group of established democracies in Botswana, Mauritius, and Senegal, an increasing number of African countries held multi-party elections, and successive incumbent regimes were voted out of office from the early 1990s. The first inclusive democratic election in South Africa in April 1994 was a landmark moment, providing a source of inspiration for democracy activists across the continent by marking the formal end of Apartheid rule. Many leading members of CSOs assumed positions of authority in newly formed democratic governments, bringing in fresh voices and perspectives to decision-making. Civic space widened as repressive laws on freedoms of association and expression were repealed, and legislation governing the non-profit sector became more permissive.
CSOs increasingly engaged in deliberative spaces and formal consultation mechanisms as their influence spread, and governments sought independent views and contributions to inform policy. Examples include the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a global transparency initiative predicated on a tripartite governance mechanism that involves governments, companies, and civil society in overseeing progress on governance reforms in the natural resources sector. By 2024, over half the countries on the African continent had signed up as members of EITI, implementing the EITI Standard and subject to periodic independent review.3 The Open Government Partnership (OGP) promotes open government and citizen participation across a range of sectors, with 14 member governments in Africa jointly developing reform commitments in partnership with CSOs. Along with similar multi-stakeholder initiatives in the infrastructure and fisheries sectors, these initiatives offer platforms for civil society engagement that demonstrate the constructive contribution to policy reform and improved governance.
But despite such progress, hopes for a lasting transition and a sustained process of democratic consolidation have rarely been fulfilled in practice. While democratic elections and changes of government through the ballot box endured in countries such as Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Zambia, other countries experienced rollbacks in democracy as governments that had come to power through elections following popular protests resorted to authoritarian methods to retain political control.
Several entrenched regimes, led by ageing dictators, have retained power through repression and by manipulating election outcomes in their favour. Africa has some of the longest-surviving political leaders anywhere in the world, extending into decades of continued rule, often through the extension or abolition of term limits. In West Africa, military intervention resurfaced after many years of civilian rule with a series of coups in the early 2020s in Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon, Guinea, Mali, and Niger, justified in part by resource nationalism and anti-colonial sentiments. Regional bodies such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) proved incapable of enforcing democratic norms and upholding civilian rule. While reflecting experience from a highly diverse continent, these examples illustrate that democracy in Africa is waning or at best stalling, forming part of a global third wave of autocratisation (Gyimah-Boadi 2015; Lührmann and Lindberg 2019; Arriola, Rakner and van der Walle 2022).
While elections have been susceptible to manipulation to justify the survival of incumbent authoritarian regimes, some recent contests in 2024 demonstrate the durability of multi-party elections, exemplified by a youthful political party ousting a two-term incumbent regime in Senegal, the African National Congress’ (ANC)’s political dominance eroded to produce a coalition government in South Africa, and the opposition coming to power in Botswana after decades of one-party rule (Resnick and Signé 2024).
Other countries have suffered from a return to conflict as contending political forces have turned to violence to enforce their dominance through military means, as the examples of the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, and Sudan testify. Violence has intensified in many countries, with widespread abuses of human rights and failures to protect citizens through the rule of law.4 Factors such as economic stagnation, weak governance, entrenched corruption, and the rise of separatist and jihadist groups have all played a role in contributing to a growth in political instability and a rollback in democracy.
Corruption continues to plague many governments on the continent, increasingly fuelled by contestation over access to critical minerals (Sturman et al. 2022). Data from the 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index shows that the problem remains deep and significant in most countries across the African continent, with little progress against corruption, despite some notable improvements in countries like Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, and the Seychelles (Transparency International 2024).
Over the past decade, governments of various political hues have introduced restrictions on civil society through onerous registration and reporting requirements, and restrictions on foreign funding (Dupuy, Ron and Prakash 2016; Cheeseman and Dodsworth 2023). These were exacerbated by curbs on associational activity enforced during Covid-19 pandemic lockdowns. Human rights defenders have been targeted with repression and public protests have met with violent responses by police and paramilitary forces (Bakke, Mitchell and Smidt 2020). Media freedoms have eroded in more than 20 countries, with multiple cases where journalists have been attacked and detained and laws introduced to curb independent reporting (CIVICUS 2024). By 2024, few African countries retained a positive score in the CIVICUS ratings on civic space, with only Botswana, Liberia, and Namibia scoring as narrowed and none classed as open.
These developments are in sharp contrast to the optimism evinced by many observers of African democratisation in the 1980s and 1990s. What explains these trends and how has civil society responded? Why have expectations on the contribution of civil society to democratic consolidation not been fulfilled in practice? What does this mean for the role and contribution of foreign aid donors? The remainder of this article seeks answers to these questions. Section 2 considers how African civil society has responded to these political developments. Section 3 examines the role and contribution of foreign aid to funding CSOs in Africa, focusing on trends over the past three decades. The concluding section assesses the prospects for civil society to contribute to democratic consolidation. It ends with some broader policy and practical considerations for the future funding and sustainability of civil society initiatives.
The civil society landscape has evolved in response to these political developments. The expectation of a sustained wave of democratic transitions across the African continent was no longer tenable by the early 2020s as authoritarian rule re-established a foothold, often accompanied by a crackdown on the independent sector. One form of response has been for CSOs to double down on activities designed to protect civic space and foster adherence to human rights, thereby fostering democratic resilience. However, while civil society retains democratic vitality in several African countries, reflected in the capacity of citizens to mobilise over the protection of civic space in Kenya, Nigeria, and Senegal in 2024, these remain the exception rather than the rule.
CSOs are also responding by avoiding promoting issues that can attract retribution from government authorities in the form of crackdowns on associational activity and legislative restrictions on freedom to operate. The consequence is for CSOs to focus on less contentious forms of activity, and to place less emphasis on democracy and governance. There is now a rich and well-capacitated set of civil society actors engaged in governance and human rights issues in Africa. That said, the majority of CSOs choose to focus on providing services and humanitarian aid to populations adversely affected by declining economic circumstances and violent conflict (Tripp 2018). While this approach potentially detracts from the goals of strengthening democracy and governance, it has the advantage of demonstrating the contribution that such organisations make to development as a basis for building wider political support in the face of legislative actions to curtail their activities (Cheeseman and Dodsworth 2023).
A more malign phenomenon that undermines the role and contribution of African CSOs to democratic consolidation concerns their relationship to political parties and sources of state power. Several organisations defended military coups in West Africa on the grounds that incumbent regimes had lost popular legitimacy and failed to improve living standards, borne out in public opinion surveys showing strong support from citizens in several countries. Some CSOs mobilised nationalist sentiment over French military and economic interests, eschewing leaders with long-term ties to France and the Francophonie (Vines 2024).
Despite these negative trends, there are grounds for continued optimism. Reversals in democratic practices and growing authoritarianism do not mean that Africans are turning away from democracy as the preferred system of government. Survey evidence from Afrobarometer reported in 20235 shows that for the most part Africans remain committed to democracy, with two-thirds of respondents saying that they prefer democracy to other systems of government, especially military and one-party rule: ‘We find that despite the many efforts to undermine democratic norms and freedoms, citizens continue to adhere to them. They believe that the military should stay out of politics, that political parties should freely compete for power, that elections are an imperfect but essential tool for choosing their leaders, and that it is time for the old men that cling to power to step aside’ (Afrobarometer 2023: 1).
At the same time, these surveys find that citizens find the quality of democracy lacking, in its failure to tackle the perceptions of widespread and worsening corruption and political systems that fail to deliver democratic and accountable governance to respond to their concerns. This is reflected in falling levels of satisfaction with democracy and a declining perception that their countries fulfil their democratic aspirations in practice.
Optimism around the potential role and contribution of CSOs in promoting good governance and democratic consolidation in Africa was accompanied by a steep rise in foreign aid from the early 1990s, contributing to a mushrooming of organisations working on this set of issues (Fowler 2013). Many benefited from a substantial increase in funding, enabling them to recruit staff, strengthen capacity, and engage in a wide range of activities to promote citizen awareness, deepen political participation, and hold governments to account (Robinson and Friedman 2007).
However, not all observers welcomed this trend. There were concerns around creating potential dependency, promoting agendas in favour of economic reform, and favouring international NGOs over local organisations (Hearn 2000, 2007). Further questions arose around the ability of African CSOs to influence government policy and legislation, emphasising their role in strengthening citizen voice and enhancing pluralism (Robinson and Friedman 2007; Tripp 1998). Others harboured more fundamental doubts over the extent to which CSOs could make a substantial contribution to democratic consolidation, highlighting concerns over their capacity and willingness to challenge the threat of authoritarian reversals (Gyimah-Boadi 1996; Ndegwa 1996).
Many CSOs emerged and thrived from the 1990s following the sharp increase in foreign funding. This helped to build capacity and provided important sustenance to programmes devised to strengthen and consolidate democracy, through activities such as human rights education and protection, media training, political party training, and election monitoring (Ottaway and Carothers 2000; OECD 2023). A wider body of evidence highlights many successes in promoting citizen engagement and practices of participation from Africa and elsewhere (Gaventa and Barrett 2012).
Three decades on, the situation is very different, with a series of authoritarian reversals and weakening of democratic institutions. CSOs have proved relatively powerless to challenge these trends and resist the efforts of power holders to close civic space. The expectation that civil society would be able to contribute to democratic consolidation by protecting civil and political rights, ensuring free and fair elections, holding elected officials accountable, and promoting high standards of probity and transparency in public life underestimated the obduracy of political leaders who want to retain power by all available means, including violent repression (Nzabirinda 2023).
But the heavy dependence on foreign funding of many CSOs engaged in these activities also brings risks, and renders them vulnerable to government restrictions and crackdowns. Foreign funding has dwindled, during and after the Covid-19 pandemic, while international donors were already retreating from an overt democracy promotion agenda (Resnick and van der Walle 2013). Recent evidence points to a significant fall in funding to CSOs and consequent threats to organisational sustainability in all but five countries in Africa, a trend that is likely to accelerate, with a sharp downturn in aid funding from the United States and other donors from 2025 (USAID, FHI 360 and ICNL 2023). Efforts to build domestic funding capacity for CSOs engaged in democracy building have been met with a mixed response, with much of the philanthropic funding from individuals and businesses directed to welfare and humanitarian work rather than human rights and governance (Aina 2014; Fowler 2021).
These developments should not necessarily lead to a pessimistic conclusion on the contribution of CSOs to democratic consolidation. Civil society is just one variable shaping prospects for advancing democracy in Africa, albeit a critical one. There are three reasons to harbour some degree of optimism while maintaining a pragmatic sense of realism on the contribution civil society can make to consolidating democracy and resisting autocracy. First, the growth of the non-profit sector in Africa in just three decades has been remarkable, across all sectors, but especially in democracy and human rights, from a very low base. Many organisations retain vitality and achieve impact, despite efforts to curb their activities and funding constraints. Second, citizens in several large African countries remain willing to engage in large-scale protests over poor governance and abuses of human rights. Third, the expressed preference of two-thirds of Africans for democratic forms of government is cause for hope, despite economic downturns, entrenched corruption, and growing authoritarianism.
These conclusions carry several policy and practical implications. First, while there are limitations on what can be accomplished, foreign aid donors should not abandon support for democracy building and governance through CSOs, as civic space remains an important redoubt against authoritarian reversals and a trend towards autocratisation in Africa. There will be a need for aid donors to tailor their financial support to CSOs to domestic political contexts in the face of restrictions imposed on foreign aid funding by many governments across the continent. It will also require complementary actions on the part of diplomatic actors to offer support to CSOs by calling out repressive legislation or human rights abuses.
In some cases, it will not be possible for donors to continue with financial support for governance reform efforts led by civil society where the risks of retribution are significant and external intervention could backfire. However, while it has been hard for donors to demonstrate enduring benefits for long-term support for civil society, reducing financial support at this critical juncture further risks eroding one of the few modalities available to African citizens to defend rights of association and expression. In this respect, the conclusion reached by Robinson three decades ago remains valid: ‘Donor efforts… will therefore need to proceed in a cautious and well-informed manner in order to avoid forcing the agenda at a pace that would run counter to the twin objectives of democratic consolidation and promoting a pluralistic political culture in developing countries’ (Robinson 1995: 80).
Second, investments in building domestic philanthropic capacity should continue as the long-term health and sustainability of the sector will ultimately depend on sources of funding mobilised in support of civil society within African societies, rather than on foreign aid. This is all the more important as traditional donors scale down their funding in response to domestic budgetary pressures and defence priorities, or the sudden closure of development assistance programmes by leading aid donors, with major repercussions for democracy and governance work. Reliance on foreign aid leaves CSOs exposed to rapid changes in funding priorities but also vulnerable to efforts by governments to close down or restrict such funding. At the same time, domestic philanthropy remains modest in size, and there is often an aversion to supporting governance and democracy initiatives that can be perceived as risky and political.
Third, creating opportunities for CSOs to participate in multi-stakeholder initiatives alongside government and the private sector can build trust and demonstrate the value of citizen voice for devising shared solutions to improving governance and strengthening democracy. The multi-stakeholder model has extended beyond its initial roots in the extractive sector to encompass fisheries, forestry, and infrastructure. This offers a space for civil society to engage in governance issues that have immense practical significance for improving the lives of African citizens without incurring the risks associated with democracy promotion funded by foreign aid.
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