Abstract
In confronting neoliberal models and their emphasis on state–
market alliances, new developmentalism has emerged as a powerful
alternative, received with enthusiasm by progressive forces. It has certainly
been responsible for unquestionable advances in fighting inequalities,
particularly in Latin America where it has been adopted by leftist
governments from 2000 on. However, it has been unable to redefine the
old formula of a 'strong, self-sufficient state' and the centralising political
practices characteristic of the 'old' developmentalism. Therefore, the article
argues that the new developmental state has ended up by draining the
potential of participatory democracy, which had brought together hopes
for inclusive and sustainable development policies and had announced a
new alliance between state and society through which rights could be
ensured and democracy deepened.
Keywords: new developmentalist state, participatory democracy,
Latin America, leftist governments.
1 Introduction
The new developmentalist state has been received with enthusiasm
as an alternative to neoliberal models and their emphasis on state–
market alliances. Whereas it has been responsible for unquestionable
advances in fighting inequalities, particularly in Latin America where
it has been adopted by leftist governments from 2000 on, I argue that
the integration of social participation in its decision-making processes
and the building of a new balance between state and society has faced
significant limits. Centralising political practices characteristic of the
'old' developmentalism resist confronting the alleged 'novelty' of the
new model, and drain the potential of participatory democracy, which
had brought together hopes for inclusive and sustainable development
policies, and had announced a new alliance between state and society
through which rights could be ensured and democracy deepened.
This article will first discuss the trajectory of participatory democracy
and the limits and difficulties it has faced; it will then examine the emergence of leftist governments in the continent, and will conclude by
arguing that their adoption of a new developmental conception of the
state has undermined the participation of society in sharing decisions
concerning development directions.
2 The institutional participation of civil society: promises of a new
relation between state and society
During at least the last two decades, the institutional participation
of civil society1 became largely accepted in many parts of the world
as a principle to ensure the deepening of democratic construction.
In Latin America, between the early 1990s and the early 2000s, new
constitutions in 19 countries included some provision for citizen
participation, 17 of them incorporated mechanisms of direct political
participation, and 14 provided for public spaces with both state and civil
society representation (Hevia 2006).
Obviously, the meanings and intentions as well as the practices of these
provisions vary. Different conceptions of social participation and social
control of the state have been in dispute, according to different existing
political projects (Dagnino 2004; Dagnino et al. 2006). From more radical
views such as participation as 'sharing power' to notions of participation
as a tool to provide information and increase the state's efficiency, or
even as a mere rhetorical instrument for electoral purposes, a quite
diverse set of meanings has been attributed to the term by different
political forces, with equally different practical political implications.2
Brazil is frequently pointed out as the country with the largest and most advanced experiments in participatory democracy. The creation of the Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) in 1980, with its original strong commitment to social participation, was a central element in the gradual establishment of what came to be referred to as the 'architecture of participation' (Dagnino and Teixeira 2014). It began with the wellknown Participatory Budget created in 1989 in Porto Alegre, under the government of the Workers' Party, which became a model that was internationally praised, including by the World Bank. This 'architecture' comprises public policy management councils and conferences, established at municipal, state and national levels, involving millions of people to discuss public policies in several policy areas such as education, health, social services, children and adolescents, women, the environment, food security, racial equality, culture, etc. as well as a myriad of other participatory mechanisms. It is worth mentioning, however, that central economic policies have remained immune to civil society participation.
Participatory experiments spread throughout Latin America3 in varied formats and travelled to many parts of the world. Although they became the focus of attention and, in countries like Brazil, had heavily concentrated the efforts of social movements, given their novelty and the potential they represented, they did not exhaust all other modalities of social participation, such as protests and other forms of pressure towards the state.
Bringing together representatives of both state and civil society to discuss and deliberate about public policies in several areas, these institutions have been seen as new models for the relations between them. They can be considered new at least in two aspects: they opened space for excluded voices, including and mainly from popular sectors, to be heard, as compared to the previous monopoly of access to decisions by dominant sectors. In addition, they intended to provide channels of representation additional to representative electoral democracy, the traditional and dominant formula for relations between state and society. The already age-old – and now aggravated – 'crisis of representation' was already present in that intention.
To what extent these institutions have been effective, their successes and
failures, is a question that has already produced a vast literature, which
shows largely mixed results from hundreds of case studies throughout
the continent. After a first wave of enthusiasm and praise, more recent
studies present much more nuanced and critical views, emphasising the
limits and difficulties faced by participatory democracy.
The formats of participatory experiments, their degrees of formalisation,
scope and resources, their either consulting or decision-making character,
as well as their permanence, vary very much throughout the continent.
Their effectiveness also varies and is deeply affected by many factors.
These should be mentioned in order to make clear that there are
multiple sources of limits and difficulties faced by such experiments: the
specific political contexts in which deliberation takes place, the political
forces involved and the power correlation between them, and how
conflictive are the interests at stake. Furthermore, the commitment and
qualification of state representatives, the organisational density of the
sectors of civil society that are represented, the technical and political
qualifications of civil society's representatives, and most importantly the
frequently scarce resources available for policy implementation, are all
relevant elements bearing on the effectiveness of participatory spaces.
For civil society itself, institutional participation also brought mixed
consequences. On the one hand, it required the acquisition of new
capacities, very different from the usual repertoires of collective
action; a demanding learning process, which tended to encourage a
'professionalisation' of civil society representatives. This aggravated
the proliferation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), already
under way under the neoliberal model, in which they had been
selected as the reliable, loyal, non-conflictive interlocutors of the
state, especially in taking charge of formerly public responsibilities.
The relationship between representatives and their social bases
suffered from this professionalisation as social mobilisation and
political organisation tended to take second place. On the other hand,
more positively, representatives have been able to learn the modes
of state operation, improve their negotiation and deliberation skills
and extend their networking. Research has shown that, successes
or failures notwithstanding, civil society representatives assess their
participation in the Brazilian Policy Councils, for example, as positive (Szwako 2012). On the negative side, more critical analyses point out
the risks of 'co-optation', instrumentalisation by political parties and
clientelism emerging in this closer relationship with different political
and economic actors.
Effectiveness, that is to say, the extent to which civil society representatives
have impact on public policies formulated in participatory spaces, is
very difficult to measure (Pires 2011), not least because results reflect so
many different factors. However, despite the extremely unequal weight
of popular social sectors as compared to the market, participatory
institutions did provide space for the building of alliances between civil
society and sectors of the state, especially when similar political projects
brought them together on specific issues (Dagnino 2002).
3 The emergence of leftist governments: promises renewed
This last assertion has been precisely what underlay the expectations
of progressive sectors of civil society when, from the 2000s on, leftist
governments emerged in Latin America. Social movements heavily
supported these new governments in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela,4 renewing their hopes for the
consolidation and expansion of mechanisms of participation of civil
society as well as of democratising alliances with the state. These new
forces occupying the state were seen as possibilities of rupture with the
neoliberal cycle that had increased inequalities, eliminated rights and
taken to an extreme the alliance between state and markets.
Although this emergence of leftist governments has been generalised
as a 'red' or 'pink' tide, there are significant differences between them.
Participatory experiments, in spite of their continental and even global
diffusion and adoption by different political forces, have traditionally
been associated with the left. However, the emphasis they have received
within the new governments has varied. In some cases, new mechanisms
have been created (Uruguay and Venezuela); in others, existing
participatory institutions have been strengthened and/or extended
from local to national levels; in others yet these institutions 'have been
relatively scarce' (Argentina and Chile) (Goldfrank 2016: 5) or appear
prominent in the new constitutions but not so much in practice (Bolivia
and Ecuador).5 In Brazil, changes in the conception of participation
itself, from more radical views of participation as sharing power to
milder versions of 'consultation' and 'dialogue' closer to neoliberal
procedures, became evident along President Lula's mandates (2003–10)
(Dagnino and Teixeira 2014), whereas his successor, President Dilma
Rousseff (2011–16), has been clearly insensitive to the issue. According
to Boaventura de Souza Santos, a Portuguese scholar well known for his
defence of democratic deepening,
[T]he tools of participatory democracy that were the hallmark of popular government (participatory budgeting, sectorial policy councils, national conferences) have been worn down, losing the capacity for renovation, and above all, they were relegated more and more to deciding over less and less important issues. The major investments and large public works projects were left out of the reach of participatory democracy (Souza Santos 2014).
How to explain this relative fading of participatory democracy when
expectations foresaw a different trajectory? In addition to the general
factors influencing its effectiveness, a number of specific reasons can be
highlighted. The correlation of forces vis-à-vis dominant conservative
sectors, including members of representative democracy who felt
their power threatened,6 the priority given to so-called 'governability',
and the different degrees of commitment to participatory democracy
amongst leftist forces themselves (Goldfrank 2016) may help to explain
the declining progress. However, an often-neglected but central factor,
I argue, lies in the reconfiguration of the state undertaken by leftist
governments under neo-developmentalism.
4 What is new about the new developmental state?
In spite of their differences, what all those governments had in
common was the adoption of a proactive conception of the role of
the state towards development policies: even with different emphases
and degrees of consistency, the new developmentalist state re-emerged
in Latin America in reaction to the central feature of neoliberalism:
a 'reduced' state, increasingly subordinated to the market. That
conception of the new developmentalist state, in a rather perverse
manner, contributed to the declining trajectory of participatory
democracy and installed an alliance between state and society that did
not favour the deepening of democracy.
New developmentalism has been the object of heated debate in Latin
America, involving economists almost exclusively. Efforts to distinguish
it from both the 'old' developmentalism and the neoliberal model it is
supposed/intended to replace have been key in this debate. Differences
and similarities or ruptures and continuities with respect to the latter
have been emphasised, particularly about the relations between state and
market, defined by the new approach as one of 'complementarity', with
reinforced regulatory capacities of the state, and the explicit refusal of
any interventionist or protectionist features. To critics that stressed the
'ambiguity' of the new model, Bresser Pereira,7 a Brazilian economist
who is one of its leading defenders, states: '[N]ew developmentalism is
pragmatic', it 'desires a strong market and a strong state and doesn't see
any contradiction between the two' (Bresser Pereira 2010: 26, 51).
There is no ambiguity, however, in the new developmentalism's statement about its redistributive goals. And indeed, it has been responsible for unquestionable advances in fighting inequalities, significantly abandoning the neoliberal targeted/focused social policies and adopting more universalising ones, recognising the rights of excluded groups such as of the poor, indigenous people, black minorities, women, homosexuals, etc. The Brazilian experience offers abundant examples of these directions.
Rather than discussing here the several economic dimensions in
this debate, what I want to explore is the character of the state in
neo-developmentalism and the kind of alliance between state and
society that it represents. More interested in asserting the central rupture
with neoliberalism, neo-developmentalists basically limit this specific
discussion to the simple affirmation of a protagonist 'strong state'.
Therefore, it is in their efforts to assert the distinction between new and
old developmentalism (Bresser Pereira 2012) that we can find interesting
clues with respect to the new developmental conception of the state.
The 'old' developmentalist model, also known as national
developmentalism, was first established in Latin America during the
1930s and 1940s, with the governments of Vargas in Brazil (1930–45
and 1950–54), Perón in Argentina (1946–55 and 1973–74) and
Cárdenas in Mexico (1934–40). In very different economic, political,
social and international contexts, the need for a 'strong state', again,
was its key feature. At its beginning, in the Brazilian experience, where
the model continued to prevail, more in theory than in practice, until
the military coup in 1964, it was intended to face two main tasks:
the building of the nation and of the state itself. This assessment saw
Brazil as plagued by regionalisms, fragmentation of political parties
(partidarismos) and particularisms that needed a strong unifying state,
able not only to promote development but also 'to organise' society and
build a proper nation. In the huge and dense theoretical production of
the time, defenders of national developmentalism considered the state
as the 'main agent of social transformation' (Dagnino 1986).
After a period of limited democratic rule, the 'strong state' became an
openly authoritarian regime, from 1937 to 1945. The installation of
industrial capitalism and the organisation of society along corporative
lines, yet coupled with the delivery of social rights and the recognition
of labour as a legitimate political interlocutor, even if subordinated
to the state, were the main results of the first Vargas period,8 also
recognised as establishing the beginnings of populism.
Almost 80 years later, the discourse of new developmentalism seems to bring back the same conceptions, strikingly repeating the same vocabulary: the 'strong state is the par excellence instrument of the nation's collective action', states Bresser Pereira (2010: 3). More explicitly, other authors, referring to a needed 'certain degree of decentralisation' of the state, add:
It should be noted, however, that this doesn't mean that the most important decisions referring to public policies to be implemented should be equally decentralized, since governmental agents, democratically elected, should be responsible for their definition. (Sicsú, Paula and Michel 2007: 513, author's translation from the Portuguese)
Here, representative democracy seems to be the only envisaged channel for participation.
The meaning and the implications of the characterisation of the nature
of the developmental state are perhaps further clarified by what is absent in them: in the discourse of its proponents there isn't any reference
to the role of society's participation in the formulation of public
policies, after, in the Brazilian case, more than 20 years of accumulated
experience. The reduction of social participation to representative
democracy through voting is very much linked to the recurrence of a
conception of the state as an almighty, self-sufficient entity, still very
much rooted in the Latin American political imaginary and adopted
and promoted by leftist governments. Having been elected with the
strong support of social movements, leftist governments see themselves
as legitimately representing the interests and claims of excluded sectors
of society, given basically their distributive commitment – what they
rightfully were to a significant extent. Capitalising on their social policies
of recognition and distribution, there has been a gradual increasing
closure of decision-making in the state. The new alliance between
state and excluded sectors of society, announced by the experiments in
participatory democracy, and based on sharing power and on the social
control of the state, has gradually assumed a limited character.
Instead, traits of the old paternalistic alliance have showed their
resilience. Strong charismatic leaders have transferred their legitimacy
to a progressively self-contained state, a mechanism whose initial
effectiveness has tended to erode as contradictions between state policies
and social movements' demands have become increasingly evident. As
Gallegos states about Ecuador, 'the articulation between decisionismo and new developmentalism didn't seem favourable to the effective
participation of a wider sector of social actors in the conduction of the
transformation process' (Gallegos 2008: 195).
References to the 'nation' also resonate with old developmentalism. The
Patria Bolivariana of Hugo Chávez, Garcia Linera's Bolivian Nation and
Rousseff's Patria Educadora indicate attempts to formulate a national
identity from above, where the state – and not society – defines and
incarnates the 'nation'. The return to these conceptions maintains an
odd relationship, to say the least, to the primacy of social participation
asserted in official discourse, as well as, in some cases, to the recognition
of pluri-culturalism (Rivera Cusicanqui 2014).
Other perverse implications followed from a conception of the state that
sees itself as the 'fundamental agent of transformation'. The tendency
to replace their original political projects with 'power projects' is visible
in the present decline of leftist governments. Holding state power and
particularly remaining in power at any cost (and costs may include
corruption and authoritarian measures, as well as all kinds of alliances
and concessions in order to ensure so-called 'governability') seem to be
justified in the name of that cause.
The basic requirement of neo-developmentalism, as put by its defenders,
is 'the primacy of the role of the state as a pro-development political conscious action' (Carneiro 2012: 776). There is no question that the
definition of such a protagonist role configured an encouraging premise
towards the replacement of the dominant neoliberal model. What is in
question is how this premise has unfolded to constitute a real rupture, not
only with neoliberal pillars but also with the statist conception of politics
(Lechner 1990) that has historically plagued Latin America.
Economic policies under neo-developmentalism showed clear limits
in pointing towards a radically new model of development. Based on
growing processes of financialization and on 'extractive rent', through
the intensification of mining and other extractive industries, including
soy agriculture (Gago and Mezzadra 2015), the neo-developmental
states have been particularly ambiguous with respect to their
environmental policies. This is also one area, among others, where the
participation of civil society and social movements has been remarkably
bypassed. In Brazil, the approval of the Forest Code and the building
of the Belo Monte hydropower plant have been clear examples of long
and intense social mobilisation, ignored by the government. In spite of
heavy protest, conflicting economic and environmental policies have led
to devastating environmental consequences as in Bolivia and Ecuador.
In these countries, as in others, initial progressive discourses gave way
to contradictory practices, both with respect to citizen voice and to
sustainability concerns.
Social movements and popular sectors have become increasingly critical
of governments' actions. Resort to 'direct action' through protests,
occupations and invasions have intensified as the negotiation practices
made possible by the institutional channels of participation show
their paralysis and inefficiency. The initial support from those sectors,
sustained by distributive and recognition policies, is at stake. The
advance of neoliberal forces in countries like Brazil and Argentina show
a backward movement that can be explained by a number of factors.
However, the contradictions of the developmental state format adopted
by leftist governments with respect to the role of people's voice in that
configuration are certainly part of that explanation.
5 Conclusion
The ambiguities and contradictions of neo-developmentalism in Latin
America, which has culminated in defeats and a crisis of the left, impose
a sober political analysis. Among the various features that can help us to
understand such a trajectory, I have focused on the features of its selfdefined
main agent, the 'strong state'. I have argued that the dilemmatic
paradox of new developmentalism implemented by leftist governments
lies in its very conception of the state: while its new protagonist role
could have represented new paths towards a more equal and sustainable
development, it has implied the 'downgrading' of participatory
democracy and the confining of participation to representative
democracy. By relying on 'old' ways of doing politics, reviving the
traditional state monopoly of decision-making and emphasising the role
of a deteriorated mode of social representation, new developmentalism has failed to fully incorporate what represented a crucial innovative
change in patterns of Latin American democracy. It is not by chance
that claims for substantive participation have been reiterated by recent
protests throughout the continent, as in Brazil, where millions of people
filled up the streets of several cities in June 2013, expressing a clear
discrediting of parliamentary representatives and of an unresponsive
and corrupted political system.
Lessons from the crises of leftist governments under new developmentalism must be learned in order to push back the full resumption of neoliberal models, already on course in countries such as Brazil and Argentina. The struggles of social movements for participation in decision-making processes, intended to ensure democratic deepening and truly new routes for development, should not be ignored. The challenge posed by the construction of democratic new alliances between state and society cannot be ignored, therefore, amidst a reconfiguration of the role of the state as a 'pro-development political conscious action' that is aligning with a radical redefinition of the decision-making power of society.
Notes
1 Civil society is understood here as the space occupied by organised
sectors of society, such as social movements, non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) and a multiplicity of other organisations,
whose common characteristic is the search for access to the
public space in order to achieve their objectives. Civil society is
characterised by its heterogeneity and by the competition between
different interests and projects in conflict, being, therefore, a political
space by definition (Dagnino 2011).
2 For both radical democratic and neoliberal notions of participation,
see Dagnino (2004) and Dagnino et al. (2006).
3 For a thorough survey of participatory instances in Latin America,
including a reading list, see Eng and Perron (2013), Citizen
Participation in Latin America: Innovations to Strengthen Governance.
4 The emergence of leftist governments in the continent began with
the presidency of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (1999–2013). The
election of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva in 2003 launched the Workers'
Party governments: he was re-elected in 2006 and followed by Dilma
Rousseff, who was elected in 2010 and again in 2014, and governed
until 2016, when she was ousted from power. The peronista Nestor
Kirchner governed Argentina from 2003 until his death and was
succeeded by Cristina Kirchner (2007–15). In Uruguay, Tabaré
Vasquez, candidate of the Frente Amplio, was elected in 2005,
succeeded in 2010 by Pepe Mujica and returned to the presidency in
2015. Evo Morales and Vice-President Alvaro Garcia Linera, from
the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement to Socialism, MAS), have
governed Bolivia since 2006, having been re-elected in 2009 and
2015. Rafael Correa founded the movement Alianza PAIS (Patria
Altiva y Soberana, Proud and Sovereign Patria) to run for presidential
election in 2006, and is now in his third mandate as president of Ecuador. In Chile, the Socialist Party's Michelle Bachelet was
president from 2006 to 2010, and elected again in 2014.
5 In Ecuador, for example, the moderately radical initial establishment
of the Council of Citizen Participation and Social Control,
denominated the Fifth Power, has been undermined, according to
Moscos (2014), by 'executive intrusions' and 'hyper-presidentialism'.
6 In 2014, when the Brazilian government proposed the institution
of a National System of Social Participation to the Congress that
was intended to establish common rules for the different existing
participatory institutions, there was a very strong reaction and it
has been accused of trying to install a Bolivarian Revolution in the country. Although the System was aimed at instituting participation
as 'a method of government' (Presidency of the Republic 2014),
President Dilma Rousseff never engaged herself in assuring the
political conditions for its approval. The Congress did not even put
the proposal to a vote.
7 Bresser Pereira, curiously, was the minister of state reform who, under the Cardoso government in the 1990s, led neoliberal state reform in 1995, the jewel of the crown in the implementation of the model in Brazil. Among other things, it regulated the 'social organisations' in charge of the implementation of targeted, and restricted social policies while lacking any decision-making power over them.
8 Vargas became a mythical figure in the Brazilian popular imaginary, known as the 'Father of the Poor'. In Dilma Rousseff's first electoral campaign in 2010, she was presented as the 'Mother of the Poor'(see http://politica.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,lula-vai-apresentardilma-na-tv-como-mae-dos-pobres,596194).
References
Bresser Pereira, L.C. (2012) 'Do antigo ao novo desenvolvimentismo na
América Latina', in Luiz Carlos Delorme Prado (ed.), Desenvolvimento
e crise. Ensaios em comemoração aos 80 anos de Maria da Conceição Tavares, Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto Editora
Bresser Pereira, L.C. (2010) 'A construção política do Estado', Textos para
discussão da Escola de Economia de São Paulo 273, São Paulo: Fundação
Getulio Vargas: 1–25
Carneiro, R. (2012) 'Velhos e novos desenvolvimentismos', Economia e
Sociedade 21: 748–79
Dagnino, E. (2011) 'Civil Society in Latin America', in Michael
Edwards (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Civil Society, Oxford: Oxford
University Press
Dagnino, E. (2004) 'Sociedade civil, participação e cidadania: de que
estamos falando?', in Daniel Mato (ed.), Políticas de ciudadanía y
sociedad civil en tiempos de globalización, Caracas: FaCES, Universidad
Central de Venezuela
Dagnino, E. (2002) 'Sociedad civil, espacios públicos y construcción democrática en Brasil: límites y posibilidades', in E. Dagnino (ed.), Sociedad civil, espacios públicos y democratización', Brasil: Fondo de Cultura Económica
Dagnino, E. (1986) 'State and Ideology: Nationalism in Brazil,
1930–1945', unpublished PhD dissertation, Stanford University,
Department of Political Science
Dagnino, E. and Teixeira, A.C.C. (2014) 'The Participation of Civil Society
in the Lula's Government', Journal of Politics in Latin America 6.3: 39–66
Dagnino, E.; Olvera, Alberto and Panfichi, Aldo (eds) (2006) La disputa
por la construcción democrática en América Latina, Mexico: Fondo de
Cultura Económica
Eng, J.O. and Perron, M. (2013) Guide – Citizen Participation in Latin
America: Innovations to Strengthen Governance, Mexico: ELLA/Fundar
Gago, V. and Mezzadra, Sandro (2015) 'Para una crítica de las
operaciones extractivas del capital. Patrón de acumulación y luchas
sociales en el tiempo de la financiarización', Nueva Sociedad 255
(January–February): 38–52
Gallegos, F.R. (2008) 'Democracia friccionada, ascenso ciudadano
y posneoliberalismo en Ecuador', in Carlos Moreira, Diego Raus
and Juan C. Gómez Leyton (eds), La nueva política en América Latina.
Rupturas y continuidades, Montevideo: Flacso-Uruguay/Universidad
Nacional de Lanús/ Universidad Arcis/Ediciones Trilce
Goldfrank, B. (2016) 'Participatory Democracy and Latin America's
Multiple Lefts: Comparative Perspectives', paper prepared for
RELAM 1st International Conference, 'What's Left? The Left Turn
in Latin America, 15 Years Later, Montreal, 24–27 March 2016
Hevia, F. de la Jara (2006) 'Participación ciudadana institucionalizada:
análisis de los marcos legales de la participación en América Latina',
in E. Dagnino, A. Olvera and A. Panfichi (eds), La disputa por la
construcción democrática en América Latina, Mexico: Fondo de Cultura
Económica
Lechner, N. (1990) Los patios interiores de la democracia: subjetividad y política,
Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica
Moscos, A.M. (2014) 'A New Concept of the Separation of Powers. The
Fifth Power: Transparency and Citizen Participation: A New Proposal of
New Latin American Constitutionalism – the Case of Ecuador', paper
presented to the conference on Ethics, Transparency and Integrity: Good
Government and Democracy, University of Innsbruck, 3–5 July 2014
Pires, R. (2011) Efetividade das instituições participativas no Brasil: Estratégias
de avaliação, Brasília: IPEA
Presidency of the Republic (2014) Decreto 8243, (accessed
29 October 2016)
Rivera Cusicanqui, Silvia (2014) Mito y desarrollo en Bolivia. El giro colonial
del gobierno del MAS, La Paz: Piedra Rota/Plural
Sicsú, J.; Paula, L.F. and Michel, R. (2007) 'Por que novodesenvolvimentismo?',
Revista de Economia Política 27.4: 507–24
Souza Santos, B. (2014) 'Decision Time in Brazil', telesur,
(accessed 10 June 2016)
Szwako, J. (2012) 'Aprendendo com os conflitos: tendências e riscos nas dinâmicas conselhistas', Pólis 52: 91–114
© 2016 The Author. IDS Bulletin © Institute of Development Studies | DOI: 10.19088/1968-2016.190
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non Commercial 4.0
International licence, which permits downloading and sharing provided the original authors and source are credited – but
the work is not used for commercial purposes. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/legalcode
The IDS Bulletin is published by Institute of Development Studies, Library Road, Brighton BN1 9RE, UK
This article is part of IDS Bulletin Vol. 47 No. 2A November 2016: 'States, Markets and Society – New Relationships for a New Development Era'; the Introduction is also recommended reading.